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If the supervisor of a township, in making the assessment of property for taxation, shall fraudulently,-and with a view to impose upon an individual more than
his just proportion of the public burden of taxation, assess the property of such
individual above its value, and relatively above the other assessments on his roll,
the party aggrieved may have an injunction to restrain the collection of the
excessive tax.
A property-owner seeking to enjoin the collection of taxes on the ground that
the amount is excessive, should show by his bill, as near as may be practicable,
what amount is just, and what excessive, and he should pay to the proper officer
the amount which he concedes to be properly chargeable against him. In the case
of a personal tax, a preliminary injunction should not be awarded in such case.
except upon the terms that the whole amount in dispute be paid into court, or proper security given for its ultimate payment if it shall be decreed by the court ; and
in any other case, the officer allowing an injunction has a discretion to require
such security, which it may sometimes be proper he should exercise.
He who seeks equity must do equity ; and he who seeks to enjoin the collection
of an excessive tax, must be required as a condition of relief to pay such amount
as is just.
Where, therefore, a bill was filed to restrain the collection of an excessive
tax, and the court found the tax to be excessive, and thereupon made a decree
perpetually enjoining the collection not only of the amount that was excessive,
but of the whole tax, it was held that the decree was wholly unwarranted, and it
was thereupon reversed.

TiS was a bill filed to restrain the auditor-general and the
county treasurer of Osceola county from proceeding to sell the
lands of complainant, situated in said county, for the taxes assessed thereon for the year 1869. The complainant alleged that
the supervisors of the several townships in which his lands were
situated, fraudulently assessed them above their value, and relatively very much beyond the assessment of other property, for
the purpose of relieving resident tax-payers from their proportion
of the taxes. He averred that he had ever been ready and

willing, and by his bill offered to pay his just proportion of said
taxes whenever the same should be properly and legally assessed,
but he submitted that the tax so assessed was unjust, inequitable,
and illegal, and prayed a perpetual injunction against proceedings
for their collection. The attorney-general demurred to the bill,
and the court below overruled the demurrer, and made a decree
that the tax complained of be set aside, cancelled, and declared
void, and that the lands be declared free from the lien thereof.
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.H. Canfield, for complainant.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOLEY, J.-It is impossible to sustain this decree. Accepting
to the fullest extent, as we must upon demurrer, the truth of the
matters alleged in this bill, there is no equity in relieving the
complainant altogether from the payment of taxes upon his land.,.
He owes to the state, county, and township the same duty, and is
under the same' obligation with every other property-owner
therein; and the attempt by an official to exact from him more
than is just, will not excuse him from bearing the burden so far
as it is just. The state must give him a remedy against oppression, but it is not bound to reward him because a wrong has been
meditated which had him for its object. The state cannot warrant the integrity of every inferior municipal officer, in whose
selection its citizens generally have had no choice; and if 'it could,
its responsibility ought not to exceed that which an individual
would be under in the like circumstances, which could only be to
make good to the party what he may have suffered by the wrong,
which, in this case, at the time the decree was rendered, was
nothing. Certainly the offer of the complainant to pay what is
just, cannot excuse him altogether from making any payment.
The most that he can claim under any circumstances is, that the
state shall prevent the meditated injury, and relieve his land
when its proper burden shall have been discharged. It follows
that the decree appealed from must be reversed.
It remains to be seen whether the case made by the bill would
-have entitled the complainant to any relief whatever; for if it
would, it may be proper to shape our decree differently from what
we otherwise should. The attorney-general insists that an assessment for the purposes of taxation is a proceeding quasi judicial
in its nature, the valuation being confided to the judgment and
discretion of the assessor; and that as the statute has provided
for no review of his decision by.the courts, it is not competent to
appeal to them for redress upon allegations impugning the fairness of his conclusions. And he very properly and strongly sets
forth the evils that may arise if the process of injunction shall be
employed to stay the collection of the public revenue whenever
the judgment of the tax-payer regarding relative values may so
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far differ from that of the assessor that he is led to suspect
favoritism and partiality.
That this process may be employed to an extent that shall
prove embarrassing to the public authorities is quite possible, and
that fact should make us hesitate long and consider the subject
fully in all its bearings before sustaining a jurisdiction that shall
appear in the least doubtful or unnecessary to the due protection
of individual rights.
And we agree fully with the attorney-general that the courts
cannot sit in judgment upon supposed errors of the assessor, and
substitute their own opinions for the conclusions he has drawn,
where it is his judgment and not theirs to which the subject has
been confided by the law.
But it remains to be seen whether what is sought here is a
review of the assessor's judgment. The charge is that the several
supervisors have purposely assessed the property of the complainant beyond its value and above the assessment of other persons,
with a fraudulent intent to compel the payment by him of an
undue proportion of the public taxes. The demurrer confesses the
charge, so that we are not troubled with any collateral questions
or inquiries into matters of fact. It is admitted that the supervisors have not brought their judgment to bear upon the question
of value, but have set aside and disregarded their duty for the
express purpose of perpetrating a wrong upon an individual.
The question, then, is this: A public officer being empowered by
law to apportion certain burdens among the citizens as in his
judgment shall be just, being actuated by a fraudulent purpose,
instead of obeying the law disregards its mandate, declines to
bring his judgment to bear upon the question submitted to him,
and arbitrarily and with express reference to defeating the end
at which the law aims, determines to impose an excessive burden
upon a particular citizen. Has this citizen any remedy against
the threatened wrong?
We think this question can admit of but one answer. A discretionary power cannot excuse am officer for refusal to exercise
his discretion. His judgment is appealed to, not his resentments,
his cupidity, or his malice. He is the instrument of the law to
accomplish a particular end through specified means, and when
he purposely steps aside from his duty to inflict a wanton injury,
the confidence reposed in him has not disarmed the law of the
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means of prevention. His judgment may indeed be final if he
shall exercise it, but an arbitrary and capricious exertion of
official authority, being without law, and done to defeat the purpose of the law, must, like all other wrongs, be subject to the
law's correction.
There is no function of government which requires more care,
prudence, and caution for its legal exercise than that of taxation.
The very nature of the power to tax is so general, so sweeping,
so pervading, and oftentimes its exercise is so onerous, that special
cautions are pres'crib~d to prevent abuse, extortion, and oppression. In many cases these fail of their object, and nothing is
better understood than that it is impossible that tax laws shall in
all instances operate equally and justly. But any intentional
favoritism, even though from motives of public interest, if without
express authority of law, will render void the tax proceedings.
This has been held where the property was exempted by the
taxing officers in order to encourage the erection of a public hotel,
the burden taken from this being imposed upon the public at
large: Weeks v. .Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, approved in Hersey v.
Supervisors, &c., 16 Id. 185. So the imposition of the burden in
disregard of any rule of uniformity is always held unwarranted:
Knowlton v. Supervisors, 9 Wis. 410; Jotz v. Detroit, 18 Mich.;
Bay City v. State Treasurer, 22 Id. And some cases have gone
so far as to hold that where the legislature unjustly and with the
improper motive of increasing the revenues of a city, have brought
within its limits, and subjected to its taxation, property purely
agricultural in its nature, and so situated as not to receive the
benefits of city government, conveniences, and regulations, the
courts might interfere and restrain city taxation upon such property: Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Mour. 491; Arbegast v.
Louisville, 8 Bush 271; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82; Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 Id. 86; .Fulton v. -Davenport, 20 Id. 282;
Bradshaw v. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16. It may be questionable, perhaps, whether these last cases have not gone too far, but the
ruling that fraudulent taxation should be restrained wherever the
case is such that the motive can be legally inquired into-as it
always may be in the case of the subordinate agencies-is in our
opinion very clearly sound and wholesome.
What the details of the relief shall be, is not so clear. We
have already said that the complainant should be required to do
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equity as a condition of relief. What is just to the public cannot
be done unless he pays within due time such proportion of the
tax assessed upon him as he concedes to be fair; and we think
this payment should be required by the injunction master to be
made to the proper officer as a condition. to the allowance of
injunction. To this extent the case is within the principle of
Conway v. Waverly, 15 Mich. 257, and Palmer v. Napoleon, 16
Id. 176, heretofore decided by us, and of several Wisconsin cases,
of which Hersey v. Supervisors, &c., supra, is one. Such payment will prevent the proceeding being unnecessarily embarrassing to the public authorities, and if it should be thought that the
complainant would be likely to err in his own favor in the estimate
he-would make, the power the court would have to impose costs
upon him, or to deny him costs in case his offer should prove
unreasonably small, would perhaps be a sufficient protection
against such estimates. We also think that in any such case, if
personal taxes are involved, the amount disputed should either be
required to be paid into court, or security should be exacted for
its payment, if so. decreed by the court; and the injunction
master would have a discretion to require such security in other
cases which it might sometimes be proper that he should exercise.
We think such precautions are only reasonable where interference
with the collection of the public revenues is solicited,'especially
where the grounds of relief must depend upon questions of fact,
which questions must be determined -upon evidence which, from
the very nature of the case, must be wanting in great measure in
the elements of certainty.
As we find, therefore, that the case is one in which, upon a
proper bill, relief may be had by the complainant in equity, we
shall, in reversing the decree, order the bill to be dismissed without prejudice. The defendant will recover his costs of both
courts.
The foregoing opinion embraces several questions, always of great practical
importance to the profession, and especially at this juncture of time and circumstances in our country, when the
great struggle everywhere seems to be,
on the one hand, to protect property from
taxation, and on the other, to equalize
its great inequality in distribution. by

the most unlimited exactions, for all
possible expenditures, under the convenient sobriquet of public improvement
or public good, which bids fair, in the
end, to swallow up everything else, and
leave property-owners at the mercy of an
irresponsible army of tax-gatherers. It
certainly speaks well for the law-abiding
character of our people, that they have
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hitherto submitted so patiently and with
no more demonstrative remonstrances
against the exactions, state and national,
which have been demanded of them, in
the form of taxation, within the last few
years. And it is surely to be hoped that
the same patient spirit may still abide, in
this respect. But it is obvious there
must be some limit. The same geometrical ratio of the increase of taxation,
which we have seen advancing upon us
for the last ten years, if'continued for ten
more, would amount to a redistribution
of all the propertyin the country, in every
lustrum, by means of taxation alone.
It must be obvious to all that there
can be no reliable and effective check to
this destructive process except through
the restrictive power of the judiciary.
How far this affords any well-grounded
reliance seems very questionable, when
we remember how, in the last few years,
the courts have seemed to feel it to be
their duty to find some plausible mode
of carrying onward all possible forms of
soi-disant publicimprovements, by means
of general taxation. We can all remember, on how many former occasions
the learned judge, who delivers the opinion in this case, has raised his voice
in the loudest tones of remonstrance
against the abuses of the power of taxation. And while we do not ourselves
expect to see the change of the tide of
public opinion, upon these questions,
we believe it is sure to come, and we
trust that eminent jurist and conscientious
and painstaking judge may yet be able
to reap his reward, in the acclamations
of the millions of our true-hearted people in favor of honest decency and justice in the enforcement of taxation, only
for necessary and legitimate purposes.
The particular points decided in this
case seem to us most unquestionable.
But it is too well settled, to be now
brought in question, that whenever any
fair discretion is by law intrusted to the
most subordinate officer, he must be protected in its independent exercise, by all

the muniments which the experience
of ages has been able to throw around
the action of the superior.judges. The
humblest officer, to whom there is intrusted by the law any exercise of judgment and discretion; which is but another mode of defining judicial office;
so long as he keeps within his function,.
or jurisdiction, must be protected in all
his bond fide acts, however, apparently,
groundless or unreasonable. And to
this end all fair and reasonable presumptions will always be made in -his favor.
This question is very fully presented by
BEARDSLEY, J., in Wlilson v. New York,
1 Denio 596, and was fully recognised
as applicable to tax assessors, in*Fuller
v. Gould, 20 N.Y. 643. The opinion of
the court in the latter case, by DAvIsm, J.,
contains a summary of the early cases
upon this point, which has now become
so elementary as scarcely to justify specific references to authorities. The
great practical difficulty in enforcing
such a remedy, through the instrumentality of the courts, will always arise
from the fact, that it is only getting up
one man's discretion and judgment
against that of another. And although
no such difficulty has yet arisen in the
principal case, the present olinion being
based upon a case made on demurrer to
the declaration, it will nevertheless hereafter occur, and will be found, we apprehend, not free from embarrassment.
Any rule of evidence to be applied to
this class of cases, which would allow a
superior court to sit in judgment upon,
and to reverse the action of a subordinate officer, upon any mere preponderance of evidence against the good faith
of the latter, would produce intolerable
confusion and the most offensive tyranny.
The decision thus far rests upon the
soundest basis, and we have no doubt it
will be sufficiently guarded in the future
stages of the action. We are gratified,
through the courtesy of the AttorneyGeneral, to be able to present the case to
I. F. R.
our readers.

THE EDITH.

United States Distriet Court. Southern District of New York.
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROCEEDS
OF THE SHIP EDITH.
Where materials are furnished or repairs made to a vessel in her home port, no
maritime lien arises therefor, although the vessel is engaged in foreign trade.
There being no maritime lien, neither the shipwright nor material-man is entitled to share in the proceeds arising from the sale of the vessel under admiralty
process, as against a mortgagee or assignee in bankruptcy.
The Act of April 24th 1862 of New York ESess. Laws of 1862, chap. 4823, so
far as it provides for enforcing a maritime contract by proceedings in rem against
a vessel, is unconstitutional and void.
A. held a mortgage on one-half of a vessel, and B. a subsequent mortgage on
three-fourths. The owner becoming bankrupt, the vessel was sold by proceedings
in admiralty, and the fund produced was insufficient to pay both mortgages. Held,
that A.'s mortgage was to be treated as the first lien on one-half of the fund, and
that such half must be regarded as composed of two separate funds or quarters,
one subject to A.'s mortgage alone, and one subject, first, to A.'s, and, secondly,
to B.'s mortgage; and as to the other half, B.'s mortgage was the first lien. Onequarter being more than sufficient to pay A.'s mortgage, payment was first made
of that, and then the surplus passed to the assignee in bankruptcy, and the remaining three-quarters of the fund went to the payment of B.'s mortgage.

TiE facts were these: The ship Edith was sold by order of the
Court of Admiralty for seamen's wages and towing, and the
money arising from her sale paid into court, and, after paying
the seamen and the owner of the tug their claims, there remained
a large surplus in the registry of the court. Several petitions
were filed, praying that the surplus and remnants should be duly
marshalled and distributed among he petitioners according to
their respective maritime liens on the same. The couri referred
the whole matter to a commissioner to take proof of the matters
in the petitions, and to report thereon.
This brought before the commissioner the precise question,

"which of the claims presented a maritime lien on the fund in
court ?"

The first petitioner, Bucknam & Co., claims a lien for

labor, materials, and repairs made on the ship Edith in this port.
The testimony before the commissioner shows, that at the time
that Buckman & Co. made the repairs the ship Edith was a
domestic vessel in her home port; and the commissioner held that
their claim was not a maritimc lien. To this decision Bucknam
& Co. excepted.
Charles -Donohue,for Bucknam & Co.
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Bverett P. Wheeler, for Tyler.
JTohn Sedgwick, assignee in bankruptcy, in person.
BLATCHFORD, J.-There is, in the registry of this court, the

sum of $31,176.82, the net proceeds of the sale of the ship Edith,
on a sale made of her on the 8th of May 1871, under process
issued on a decree of this court in a suit in rem against her in
admiralty. There are four claimants to portions of this fund.
D. Freeman Pople, A. Judson Bucknam, and John E. Leech,
composing the firm of Bucknam & Co., claim to be paid out of
such proceeds the sum of $3597.70, with interest. Their petition alleges that in July 1870 they, being shipwrights, repaired
the vessel in the port of New York, she being at the time a
domestic vessel, belonging in said port; that, in making such
repairs, they furnished labor and materials to said amount; and
that such amount, with interest, is still due, and is a lien on the
vessel, and was so, by the laws of the state of New York, at the
time .the materials and labor were furnished. The evidence shows
that the repairs were made by the order of the master and owners
of the vessel, and were made while the vessel was on the water;
that the vessel has always been engaged in foreign trade; that
the lien was "filed" on the 27th of July 1870 ; that thereafter,
under the state law, a warrant of seizure for the amount of the
claim was issued out of the Supreme Court of New York against
the vessel, under which she was seized by the sheriff; tlhat, under
the same law, a bond was. given and the vessel was discharged
from custody and from the warrant; and that a suit on such bond
is now pending undetermined in the Supreme Court of New York.
One Charles Carow, being the owner of the vessel, made and
delivered to C. T. Bowring & Co., on the 18th June 1869, a mortgage upon the one-half of her as security for the payment of a
promissory note for £1000 sterling, and interest of the same date,
made by Carow to the order of C. T. Bowring & Co. Such mortgage was recorded in the New York custom-house on the 23d of
June 1869.
On the 11th of January 1870, Carow, being the owner of the
vessel, made and delivered to Daniel Tyler, to secure an existing
indebtedness from Carow to Tyler, a mortgage upon three-fourths
of the said vessel. On such mortgage there is due the sum of
$55,424.46, with interest from the 1st of July 1870. This mort-
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gage was recorded in the New York custom-house on the 11th
of January 1870, and a copy of it was afterwards duly filed in
the office of the register of the city and county of New York.
The mortgage contains a clause whereby the mortgagor "doth
promise, covenant, and agree, for his heirs, executors, and ad.ministrators," to and with the mortgagee, "his heirs, executors,
administrators, and assigns, to warrant and defend the said threefourths part of said ship Edith, and all the other before-mentioned
appurtenances, against all and every person and persons whomsoever ;" and a clause that a sale under the mortgage "shall for
ever be a perpetual bar, both in law and equity, against" the
mortgagor, "his executors, administrators, and assigns, and all
other persons claiming or to claim the premises, or any part
thereof, by, from, or under them, or either of them."
Carow was, on the 28th of January 1871, adjudged a bankrupt
by this court, on a petition for adjudication filed January 13th
1871. John Sedgwick was afterwards appointed his assignee.
No objection is made by any of the parties to the payment of
the amount due to C. T. Bowring and Co. on the mortgage to
them, amounting to $5776.24.
The claim on the part of Tyler is, that the $31,176.82 should
be divided into four equal parts; that the mortgage to C. T.
Bowring & Co. should be charged as paid out of one of said four
equal parts; and that Tyler should be declared to be entitled to
three of said four equal parts. This would distribute the
$31,176.82 as follows: to C. T. Bowring & Co., $5776.24; to
the assignee in bankruptcy, $2017.96; to Tyler, $23,382.62.
The claim on the part of the assignee in bankruptcy is, that
from the $31,176.82 should be paid the Bowring claim, amounting to $5776.24, and that the balance then left, $25,400.58,
should be distributed as follows: one-fourth of it, or $6350.15,
to the assignee in bankruptcy, and the remaining three-fourths,
or $19,050.43, to Tyler.
The claims of the various parties were referred to a commissioner
to ascertain and report who are entitled to the said surplus and
remnants. He has reported that the $31,176.82 should be
divided into two equal parts of $15,588.41 each; that, taking one
of those two parts, namely, $15,588.41, the Bowring mortgage,
$5776.24, should be paid out of it; that the balance thereof,
$9812.17, should be divided into two equal parts, of which one,
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$4906.09, should be paid to the assignee in bankruptcy, and the
other, $4906.08, should be paid to Tyler; and that the other
half of the $81,176.82, namely, $15,588.41, should also be paid
to Tyler. This division distributes the $31,176.82 as follows: to
C. T. Bowring & Co., $5776.24; to the assignee in bankruptcy,
$4906.09; and to Tyler, $20,494.49.
The commissioner has also reported that Bucknam & Co. have
no lien upon said surplus and remnants, and no legal right to be
paid out of the same, in these proceedings, any portion of their
said claim.
To this report Bucknam & Co. except, on the grounds (1.)
That the report should have been that Bucknam & Co. are entititled to be paid out of the proceeds of the vessel in court; (2.)
That the report should have been that Bucknam & Co. have a
lien on the fund in court for the amount of their claim; (&.)
That Bucknam & Co. should be paid out of the fund.
The assignee in bankruptcy excepts to the report *on the
grounds: (1.) That the report allows to him out of the surplus
$4906.09, whereas it should have allowed to him $6850.15; (2.)
That it allows to Tyler $20,494.49, whereas it should have allowed
to him only $19,050.43.
Tyler excepts to the report on the grounds: (1.) That it reports
that the surplus should be divided into two equal parts, and that
the Bowring mortgage should be paid out of one of such parts;
(2.) That it reports that the balance of such one of *such two
equal parts should be equally divided between Tyler and the
assignee in bankruptcy; (3.) That it does not report that said
surplus should be divided into four equal parts, that the Bowring
mortgage should be charged as paid out of one of such parts, and
that Tyler should be declared to be entitled to three of such parts.
(1.) As to the claim of Bucknam & Co. It is contended, for
them, that their claim was a maritime lien on the vessel, without
regard to the state law; that, under the state law, they have a
lien on the vessel and her proceeds, which this court can and
ought to recognise by paying the claim out of the proceeds of the
sale of the vessel; and that, whether they had a lien or not on
the vessel, their claim should be paid out of such proceeds.
It is the recognised law of the courts of the United States that
a maritime lien does not rise on a contract for materials and supplies furnished to a vessel in her home port, even though such
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contract may be a maritime contract: The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624,
645 ; Leon v. Galeeran, 11 Id. 185, 192. It is also a principle
recognised by those courts that in respect to a maritime contract
for materials and supplies furnished to a vessel in her home port,
a state law may lawfully create such liens as it deems proper, not
amounting to a regulation of commerce, and may enact, for
enforcing such liens, reasonable regulations: The Belfast, 7 Wall.
624, 645; Leon v. Galceran,11 Id. 185, 192.
In the present case, the materials were supplied and the repairs
were made to the vessel in her home port, and no Wnaritime lien
arose therefor, although the vessel was engaged in foreign trade.
The statute of New York under which a lien is claimed is the
Act of April 24th 1862, Sess. Laws of 1862, chap. 482. By the
1st section of that act this debt, having been contracted by the
master and owners of the vessel within this state, for work done
and materials furnished for repairing the vessel, is made a lien on
the vessel, to be preferred to all other liens thereon except
mariners' wages. The act provides for filing specifications of
the lien, and for the issuing of a warrant to enforce the lien,
which is to be a warrant to the sheriff to attach and seize the
vessel to satisfy the claim, if established to be a lien on the vessel.
The warrant being executed the vessel is to be kept by the sheriff.
The warrant may be discharged on the giving of a prescribed
bond to the prosecuting creditor, conditioned to pay the amount
of all claims which shall be established to be due to the person in
whose behalf the warrant was issued, and to have been a subsisting lien on the vessel, pursuant to the provisions of the act, at the
time of exhibiting the same. If the warrant is thus discharged,
no further proceedings against the vessel seized can be had under
the act, founded upon any demand secured by such bond. The
bond must be prosecuted within three months after its delivery.
If, in an action on the bond, it is found that any sum is due to
the plaintiff, which was a subsisting lien on the vessel at the time
of exhibiting the same, as provided in the act, judgment is to be
rendered that the plaintiff recover the same; but, if in such action
it is found that no subsisting lien existed in favor of the plaintiff
at the time of exhibiting his claim, judgment is to be rendered
against him. If, within a time limited by the act, the creditor
who has exhibited his claim has not been -satisfied, and the vessel
has not been discharged, a warrant is to issue to the sheriff to sell
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the vessel, and raise a specified amount necessary to satisfy all
unsatisfied liens which have been exhibited against the vessel.
The proceeds of the sale are, until their distribution, to stand in
place of the vessel, and until such distribution any person entitled
under the act to enforce a lien against the vessel may enforce the
same against such proceeds, in the same manner as is provided in
the act for enforcing a lien against the vessel herself, and with.
like effect. On the distribution of such proceeds, the various
claims exhibited, which are found to be subsisting liens on the
vessel or her proceeds, according to the provisions of the act, are
to be paid out of such proceeds in the order of the delivery of the
respective warrants to the sheriff. - At any time before final distribution any claim exhibited may be contested in a manner prescribed. When the amount of all the claims which have been
exhibited, and which are found to have been subsisting liens on
the vessel at the time of exhibiting the same, have been finally
determined, the proceeds are to be distributed by the court. Uncontested claims entitled to be paid prior to contested claims may
be paid in the order of their respective priorities, notwithstanding
such contest; and uncontested claims may be paid after paying
all prior uncontested claims, and reserving enough to pay all prior
contested claims. Provision is made for discharging the lien on
bond after specifications of the lien have been filed, although no
warrant to enforce the lien has been issued.
In the case of The Steamboat Josephine, 89 N. Y. 19, this
statute of New York came under consideration, in the Court of
Appeals of New York. In that case a specification of lien was
filed by creditors against the steamboat, under the Act of 1862,
fAr supplies furnished by them at New York to the steamboat.
During the period covered by the furnishing of the supplies, the
steamboat was enrolled at the custom-house in New York and was
engaged in running between the port of New York and the state
of New Jersey. The Court of Appeals held that under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in The Mtoses
Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, and The Hine v. Trevor, Id. 555, the Act
of 1862, to the extent in which it authorized, proceedings in rem
against vessels for causes of action cognisable in the Admiralty,
invested the courts of New York with admiralty jurisdiction, and
was void on the ground, that, under the Constitution of the United
States, Congress had in fact, and rightfully, given to the District
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Courts of the United States exclusive original cognisance of all
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the
common law is competent to give it, and that a proceeding in ren,
as used in the Admiralty Courts, is not a common-law remedy.
There can be no doubt that all state legislation providing for the
enforcement of a maritime claim or contract in any other manner
than by a conimon-law remedy, infringes on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts and violates the Constitution of the
United States. The contract in the present case, being one for
labor and materials furnished by shipwrights in making repairs to
a vessel on the water, was a maritime contract. Whether the contract was or not one which the Admiralty Court would enforce by
a proceeding in rei against the vessel is of no consequence:
Brookman v. JHamill, 48 N. Y. 554. So far, therefore, as any
proceedings in rem against the Edith were authorized by the Act
of 1862, or were taken under that act, they were wholly void.
As the seizure of the vessel under the warrant was void, the
bond given to obtain the release of the vessel from custody was
also void: Vose v. Cockeroft, 44 N. Y. 415, 420. It is insisted,
however, that the provision of the lst section of the Act of 1862,
declaring that every debt of the character therein specified shall
be a lien on the vessel is valid, although the provisions for
enforcing the lien against the vessel are void. Even if this be
assumed, still, the 2d section of the act provides that the debt
shall cease to be a lien at the expiration of six months after the
debt was contracted, unless, at the time when the six months
shall expire, the vessel shall be absent from the port at which the
debt was contracted, in which case the lien shall continue until
the expiration of ten days after the vessel shall next return to
said port. Such six months, in the present case, expired in
January 1871, and the debt ceased at that time, at farthest, to be
a lien, unless the vessel was at that time absent from the port of
New York. The fact of such absence of the vessel is one to be
shown affirmatively by the creditor, and no such fact is shown in
this case.
Bucknam & Co. must therefore be regarded merely as general
creditors; and the question arises whether, as such, they can be
paid the amount of their claim out of these proceeds, as against
the mortgagees and the assignee in bankruptcy. In the case of
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The Neptune, 3 Knapp 94, in the Privy Council in 1835, on
appeal from the High Court of Admiralty, the vessel had been
sold under a decree in a suit for wages. A surplus remained in
the registry. A material-man claimed to be paid out of it for
supplies, and a mortgagee claimed the whole of the surplus. The
Court of Admiralty awarded to the material-man the amount of
his claim. On appeal the Privy Council reversed the decree.
The vessel was a British vessel, and the supplies were furnished
in England. Two questions were considered by the court: (1.)
Whether the matetial-man was entitled to any lien on the proceeds; (2.) If not, whether the mortgagee was entitled to such
proceeds. It was conceded that a material-man without possession
had no lien on the vessel itself for supplies furnished in England,
and could not prosecute'his suit in the Court of Admiralty against
the vessel in specie. Bat a distinction was relied on between
proceedings instituted by maierial-men against the ship in stecie,
and proceedings against surplus proceeds remaining in the registry. The principle upon which the Court of Admiralty had
proceeded was, that when a vessel had been sold under process
from that court, the balance of the proceeds, after satisfying the
immediate object of the sale, was held in usum Jus habentium;
that by the civil and maritime law material-men have a lien on
the vessel and proceeds; that although the municipal courts of
England had restrained proceedings in the Court of Admiralty,
at the suit of material-men against the vessel itself for supplies
furnished in England, no prohibition had ever issued with respect
to suits against the proceeds after lawful sale; that the reasons
on which the right of material-men to arrest the ship in such cases
had been repudiated were not applicable to the arrest of the proceeds after a lawful sale; and that, as the vessel was not bonded,
and the proceeds had been allowed to come into the registry, they
had become subject to the lien of the material-man, from which
the vessel in specie would have been exempt. The decision of the
Privy Council was, that material-men have no better claim
against the proceeds of a vessel in the registry of the Court of
Admiralty than they have against the vessel. The court confirms
this observation of Sir CHORISTOPRER ROBINSON, in The Maitland,
2 Haggard 253, 255: "There does not seem to be any solid distinction between original suits and suits against proceeds in cases
that are opposed; whereas, in cases unopposed, the exercise of a
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judicial discretion by the court in permitting bills of this kind to
be paid out of unclaimed proceeds, instead of being indefinitely
impounded, may be a sound discretion, and capable of being
justified to that extent, notwithstanding the general prohibition."
The considerations urged in favor of paying the material-man
were all of them overruled on the ground that he had no lien on
the proceeds.
In the case of The iNew Eagle, 2 W. Rob. 441, in 1846, there
was a contest over proceeds in the registry between mortgagees
of the vessel, and a creditor who claimed to be paid for money
advanced for the service of the vessel in paying seamen's wages.
Dr. LUiSHixGTON rejected the claim of the creditor and awarded
the proceeds to the mortgagees, on the ground that, after the
decision of the Privy Council in the case of The -Aeptune, it was
impossible to make a distinction between the proceeds and the
vessel itself.
In the United States it is undoubtedly true that where proceeds are rightfully in the possession of a Court of Admiralty, it
is an inherent incident to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain
supplemental suits by the parties in interest to ascertain to whom
such proceeds rightfully belong, and to deliver them over to the
parties who establish the lawful ownership thereof: Andrews v.
Wall, 3 How. 568, 573. But it by no means follows that a
general creditor, who has no lien on the thing out of which the
proceeds arise, can rightfully claim such proceeds. And although
some decisions in the United States express an opinion to that
effect, yet no one can be found which maintains the view that a
material-man having no lien is to be paid out of the proceeds of a
vessel in preference to a mortgagee, or to the assignee in bankruptcy of the person who was the owner of the vessel when the
debt was contracted. And that is the present case. There is
not enough money to pay the Tyler mortgage in full. As against
the assignee in bankruptcy, representing other general creditors
of Carow besides Bucknam & Co., it would be inequitable to
permit Bucknam & Co. to obtain a preference in this way over
such general creditors. The proceeds cannot be impounded as
belonging to Carow, because the title to them has passed to the
assignee in bankruptcy, subject only to specific liens on them.
It is by no means clear that the proposition that the lien given
by the Act of 1862 is valid, although the provisions of that act
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for enforcing it are void, is a correct one. The proper view
would seem to be, that such a lien as is given by the act is, in
analogy to the meaning and efficacy of a maritime lien, only a
privilege to arrest the vessel for the demand, which privilege
constitutes of .itself no encumbrance on the vessel, and becomes
such only by virtue of an actual attachment of the vessel: The
Globe, 2 Blatc.hf. C. C. R. 427, 433. On this view, as any
attachment of the vessel under the act is void, and the privilege
of arrest amounts to nothing, it would follow that the lien given
by the 1st section' of the act can never constitute any encumbrance on the vessel or her proceeds.
I must therefore pronounce against the payment of the claim
of Bucknam & Co. out of the proceeds, and disallow their exceptions.
(2.) As to the proper mode of distributing the $81,176.82
among the mortgagees and the assignee in bankruptcy.
The principle governing the rule of distribution adopted'by the
commissioner is not stated in his report, but it would seem to be
this: Bowring & Co. have a first mortgage, and it is on one-half
of the vessel. Tyler has a second mortgage, and it is on threequarters of the vessel. The Tyler mortgage must be regarded as
the first lien on the one-half of the vessel that is not covered ,by
the Bowring mortgage, and, after the Bowring mortgage is paid
out of the one-half that is covered by it, the remainder of such
one-half must be divided equally between Tyler and the assignee
in bankruptcy, on the idea that the parties to the Tyler mortgage intended, by mortgaging generally three-quarters of the
vessel after one-half of it had already been mortgaged generally,
to cover by the Tyler mortgage, in addition to the one-half not
covered by the Bowring mortgage, one-half of what should be left
of the one-half covered by the Bowring mortgage after the satisfaction of the Bowring mortgage; and that, as if Carow had
himself paid the Bowring mortgage, Tyler would have covered
by his mortgage the one-half not mortgaged to Bowring, and onehalf of the one-half mortgaged to Bowring, so, if the Bowring
mortgage is paid out of one-half of the proceeds, Tyler must still
cover the one-half not mortgaged to Bowring, and one-half of
what is left of the one-half of the proceeds out of which the
Bowring mortgage is paid.
Both Tyler and the assignee in bankruptcy contest the princi-
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ple adopted by the commissioner, and each of them claims a
different rule of distribution from that adopted by the commissioner, and neither of them assents to the rule proposed by the
other of them. The view of the assignee in bankruptcy is that
he has the vessel; that out of less than one-quarter of her proceeds he discharges the Bowring mortgage; that then the entire
remainder of the proceeds represents the vessel in the state in
which the Tyler mortgage attaches to three-quarters thereof; and
that, consequently, three-quarters of such remainder must be
given to Tyler and one-quarter to the assignee in bankruptcy.
The view of Tyler is, that Bowring & Co. have a first mortgage
on two-quarters of the vessel; that on one of the two-quarters
covered by the Bowring mortgage, that mortgage is the sole
mortgage; that on the other one of the two-quarters covered by
the Bowring mortgage Tyler has a second mortgage; that Tyler
has a first and the sole mortgage on the two-quarters not covered
by the Bowring mortgage; and that it is the right of Tyler to have
the Bowring mortgage satisfied out of that one of the four quarters, if sufficient, which is not covered by the Tyler mortgage, so
as, if possible, to give to Tyler three-quarters of the entire
proceeds.
The considerations urged on the part of Tyler are, that the
assignee in bankruptcy can only claim what Carow could have
claimed; that, as the one-quarter not covered by the Tyler mortgage is sufficient to pay the Bowring mortgage, no part of the
three-quarters which are covered by the Tyler mortgage can be
taken away from Tyler and given to the assignee; that such
three-quarters are three-quarters of the entire $31,176.82, and
not three-quarters merely of the $25,400.58 left after paying the
Bowring mortgage out of the $31,176.82; that Carow, by his
mortgage to Tyler, expressly agrees to warrant and defend threefourths of the vessel, that is, three-quarters of the $31,176.82,
against all persons, and therefore cannot, by himself or his
assignee, claim any part of such three-quarters; that as to him
and his assignee, the case must be treated as if no mortgage to
Bowring & Co. had ever existed; and that, consequently, as to
them, the Bowring mortgage must be wholly paid, if possible, out
of the only one-quarter which they can claim to hold as against
the mortgage to Tyler, namely, out of the one-quarter of the
entire $31,176.82. To these considerations it is replied, on the
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part of the assignee in bankruptcy, that the Tyler mortgage is a
mortgage of three-quarters of the vessel as it stood at the time
that mortgage was given, that is, subject to the then existing
encumbrance of the Bowring mortgage; that the Tyler mortgage
is a mortgage of three undivided quarter parts of the vessel, and
the Bowring mortgage one of two undivided quarter parts of the
vessel, each mortgage affecting every part of the vessel equally
with every other part of her; that the surplus of the two undivided quarters covered by the Bowring mortgage, remaining
after satisfying that mortgage, represents, with the other two
undivided quarters, the whole vessel, to three-quarters bf which
aggregate the Tyler mortgage attaches; and that, as the Tyler
mortgage was a mortgage on three undivided quarters of the
whole, subject to a prior mortgage on two undivided quarters of
the whole, the prior mortgage must be first paid out of twoquarters of the whole, and the remainder of such two-quarters
must be added to the other two-quarters, to represent the whole,
to three-quarters of which whole the Tyler mortgage attaches.
It seems to me that a proper application of the equitable principles on which a court of admiralty should proceed in distributing
these proceeds among these two mortgagees and the assignee in
bankruptcy, demands that I should regard the Bowring mortgage
as first attaching to two-quarters of the proceeds, and the Tyler
mortgage as attaching first to the two-quarters not covered by
the Bowring mortgage, and then as being a second mortgage on
one of the two-quarters covered by the Bowring mortgage. On
this view, as the amount due on the Tyler mortgage is greater
than three-quarters of the whole proceeds, I think the Bowring
mortgage should be regarded as first attaching to two-quarters,
or $15,588.41, out of the $31,176.82; that such $15,588.41
should be regarded as made up of two funds, one of them,
$7794.21, subject to the lien of Bowring & Co.'s mortgage alone,
and the other of them, $7794.20, subject to the lien, first, of
Bowring & Co.'s mortgage, and afterwards of Tyler's mortgage;
and that the claim of Bowring & Co., $5776.24, should be paid
out of the $7794.21, which is not subject tp the lien of Tyler's
mortgage, leaving the residue, $2017.96, of that $7794.21, to be
paid to the assignee in bankruptcy, and the full three-quarters,
$28,882.62, of-the $31,176.82, to be paid to Tyler. This applies
to the distribution the familiar principle, that, where there are
VOL. XX.-15
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two funds, and one of them is subject to the lien of one suitor,
and the lien of another suitor covers both, the latter suitor will
be paid, if possible, out of the fund that is subject only to his
own lien: Maclachlan on Merchant Shipping 601; The Sailor
Prince, 1 Benedict 461, 465.
Independently of this view-which would properly control the
distribution in a case where all the fund was to go to mortgagees-I think that neither Carow nor his assignee can, in view
of the warranty in the mortgage to Tyler, properly claim any
portion of three-quarters of the $31,176.82.
A,decree will be entered distributing the money in accordance
with these views, and disposing of the exceptions of Tyler and
of the assignee accordingly.

United States Circuit Court. -Districtof .Nebraska.
H. G. STOUT, BY HIS NEXT FRIEND, W. H. B. STOUT, v. THE
SIOUX CITY AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.
A father is bound by the law to maintain and protect his children, it is a duty
incumbent upon him so to do, but still if he fail in that duty, and a child of tender
years wanders from home, and is injured in consequence of the negligence of
another, the neglect of the father will not excuse the party whose negligence
caused the injury complained of, in an action by the child.
Although a parent be negligent and permit a child of tender years to wander
off from his home and go upon a railroad "turntable," and the child there
receives a serious injury, if the child was young and inexperienced and not possessed of sufficient judgment to warn him of the danger of the place or the character of the machinery where the accident occurred, and the accident was the result
of carelessness and neglect of the railroad company, still there would be a liability
upon the part of the company for the injury sustained.
It devolves upon a railroad company to protect its machinery and "turntables,"
by fastening or enclosing the same, if they are in public places or where children
are wont to resort for play, if this fact is brought home to the knowledge of the
company; but if such machinery be remote from public places, and no danger could
be reasonably apprehended from its being unfastened or unenclosed, and if it be
the custom of other prudently managed railroad companies not to fasten or enclose
similar machinery, then no such degree of care and diligence could be required of
the defendant, and it would not be liable.

Tnis was an action brought to recover the sum of $15,000
damages resulting to the plaintiff, a minor child aged six years,
on account of injuries received while at play upon the "turn-
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table" of the railroad company, in March 1869. The plaintiff's
petition alleged that the defendant was, at the time the injuries
were received, running and operating a railroad running through
the town of Blair in Washington county, Nebraska, and in connection with said railroad used and operated a " turntable,"
which was so " constructed and arranged as to be easily turned
around and revolve in a horizontal direction; that across the
upper surface thereof there were fastened two large and heavy
bars of iron corresponding with the iron rails of the railroad track
used in connection with said turntable, and so placed and arranged
that when the turntable revolved, the ends of the iron bars running across the face of the same passed by the ends of the rails
on the railroad track; that said turntable was situated in a public place, and in immediate proximity to a passenger depot of the
defendant ;" that many children were in the habit of going upon
said turntable to play; that the turntable was unfaste.neA and
in no way protected to prevent it being turned around at the pleasure of small children; that the defendant had notice of these
facts; that the plaintiff was a child of tender years without judgment or discretion, and that in consequence of the carelessness
and negligence of the defendant in not locking said turntable,
it was revolved, and while it was being so revolved by other
children, "1the plaintiff had his right foot caught between the
ends of one of the iron bars on said turntable and the end of
one of said rails upon the railroad track," and his foot'was badly
crushed, causing the loss of several bones of his foot, and was
permanently injured.
Petition also alleged that it was the duty of the defendant to
keep its turntable fastened, or in some way protected so that
children could not have access thereto.
The answer of the defendant denied all the averments of the
petition, and alleged that the plaintiff had no right upon the
turntable; that he was a trespasser, and "that law or usage or
reasonable prudence did not require The defendant to keep its
turntable locked or guarded."
Upon the trial the plaintiff proved substantially all the averments of the petition, excepting that the proof showed that the
turntable was distant from the depot of the defendant about onequarter of a mile; that the nearest public street was distant from
the turntable about 1500 feet; that the plaintiff lived with his
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parents about three-quarters of a mile away. The plaintiff also
proved that the turntable was so constructed that it was easily
turned around by children of the age of plaintiff, and was even
turned around by the wind.
The defendant introduced several railroad engineers to prove,
and did prove in fact, that it was not the custom of other railroads
to fasten, lock, or in any manner guard their turn-tables.
-E.Wakely and Strickland, Ballard & Walton, for plaintiff.
Cook and Hubbard, for defendant.
DUNDY, J., charged the jury as follows:-

Gentlemen of the jury: You are directed to find in addition to
the general verdict three special verdicts as follows:1. Was the father of the plaintiff guilty of any negligence in
allowing his child, the plaintiff, to wander away from his home
upon the grounds of the defendant ?
2. Was the plaintiff capable of exercising any judgment as to
the character of the machinery upon which he was playing, and
if so, was he negligent at the time he received the injury .
3. Was the defendant guilty of negligence in allowing the turntable in question to remain unfastened and unguarded ?
Careful reading of the petition and answer, which form the
issues, will show clearly enough that there is but little in dispute
between the parties thereto, so far as the alleged facts are concerned. It is upon questions of law, mostly, that the parties or
their counsel differ, and their differences are as irreconcilable as
the adjudged cases upon which they rely.
There does not seem to be much, if any, room to doubt that
the plaintiff was, at the time of the alleged accident, a child of
tender years. That the alleged injury to the foot was received
at the time, place, and in the manner stated in the petition, and
that the "turntable" upon which the plaintiff received the
alleged injury was owned and used by the defendant at the time
aforesaid. Nor do I understand counsel to question either one
of these propositions. It would seem, then, stiipping the whole
case of all unnecessary surroundings, that the question of negligence of one or both parties is about all that is in controversy
between them. What, then, is negligence, according to the legal
acceptation of that word? The meaning of the word is pretty
generally, and no doubt correctly, understood by those learned
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in the law, but, in my judgment, it is exceedingly hard to define.
I think I could give no definition of the word where I would be
willing to adhere to it in every case where I might be called upon
to apply a test. For, to ascertain the question of the existence
of negligence, time, place, things, persons, results, and every
thing connected with the entire transaction in question must be
taken into 'consideration. And when this be done, if we find thatsome person or corporation has done something, not in itself unlawful, in a careless and improper way, and without using ordinary caution, or -here such person or corporation is required by
law to do certain things, the performance of which is, for any
reason, omitted or neglected, in consequence and by reason of
which wrongs are done and injuries received, we can then safely
conclude that the party charged therewith is guilty of "negligence." If I am correct in what is here stated, I think I can
give a general definition of the word "negligence" that will
properly apply to the controversy between the parties to this suit,
and for my present purpose only I will say, "it is doing some
lawful act in a careless, unusual, and improper way, or omitting
the performance of some act required by law to be done, by which
injury results to the person or property of another." With the
word thus defined, you must apply the rule to the case at bar, and
if you find that either party has been guilty of such negligence,
it will be your duty to visit the consequences thereof on the party
who is responsible for the very serious accident described by the
witnesses who have testified herein.
It is claimed and insisted on by counsel for the defendant,
that the plaintiff's father was guilty of negligence in permitting
him to wander so far from home, and to go upon the turntable
of the defendant, which, it is claimed, was near three-quarters of a
mile distant. This question, as well as the question of negligence
on the part of the defendant, is not without its embarrassment.
And the opinions I now entertain and here express thereon, I
may, after further examination and. more mature reflection, be
compelled to change.
A father is bound by law to maintain and protect his children.
It is a natural as well as legal' duty resting on him so to do. To
effect this, he is authorized to exercise the necessary restraint and
control over the child to accomplish this responsible duty. This is
a duty the father owes to all of his children alike. And more
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especially does he owe it to those of tender years, who are unable
from youth and inexperience, to take care of themselves. You
will observe that this duty is one the father owes to his child. But
if the father fails to discharge that duty, and a child wanders off,
and is injured in consequence of the negligence of anothgr, the
negligence of the father will not excuse the party whose negligence caused the injury complained of. If, then, the father of
this plaintiff negligently permitted him to wander off from his
home, and to go upon the turntable, where, it is claimed, he
received the injury complained of; and if the plaintiff was so
young and inexperienced, and did not possess sufficient judgment
to warn him of the danger of the place or the character of the
machinery where the accident occurred, and the accident was the
result of the carelessness and negligence of the defendant, there
would, nevertheless, still be a liability on the part of the defendant for the injury sustained, if any. If this view of the law be
the correct one, it would seem to make but little difference about
the alleged negligence of the father of the plaintiff. But does the
testimony show, or tend to show, negligence on the part of the
father which finally resulted as before stated ? A child possessed
of natural reason and ordinary intelligence, and endowed with
the full powers of locomotion, cannot be tied up and confined as
we confine our domestic animals. This would not be permitted,
were it even practicable. Most, if not all, of us who are at all
conversant with human nature, and understand the difficulties
growing out of the parental relation, know full well how easy it
is for children six or eight years of age to escape the watchful
care and vigilance of parents for the purpose of indulging in
childlike amusements. These things ought to be fully considered
by you in order to ascertain if the father of the plaintiff was
guilty of negligence in the premises. I mean, of course, in permitting the plaintiff to wander off as before stated. Was the
plaintiff possessed of sufficient judgment and understanding to
apprise him of the dangerous undertaking which he claims he
failed to accomplish, and from which failure he claims the injury
arose ? If he had sufficient knowledge, judgment, and foresight
to know or see this, and did not exercise the same so as to avoid
the danger of such an undertaking, the defendant would not be
liable, notwithstanding it may have been guilty of some negligence. But of this you alone must judge.
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If you should be of the opinion, from the evidence, that the
plaintiff was injured at the time, in the place and manner stated
in the petition and by the witnesses, and that he was at the time
too young to have the necessary discretion to avoid such a danger
as he claims attended him, and that he was therefore without
blame, then it will become important to inquire about the alleged
negligence of the defendant. Does the testimony show negligence
on the part of the defendant? You will recollect from the evidence where the depot, round-house, and turntable were at the
lime situated, the' distance they were from each other and from
the plaintiff's home. You will also recollect the character of the
country surrounding and in close proximity to the same. The
plaintiff claims that the turntable was in a public place, and
where children were in the habit of going and playing upon it.
The defendant claims that it was in an unfrequented place, remote
from public places, and where children had no right to go, and
even if the plaintiff had a right to be there, that no negligence
could be imputed to the defendant, for the reason that due diligence was used by the defendant in taking care of and protecting
the turntable. If the turntable was a heavy and dangerous
machine, and in a public place where children were in the habit
of going to play upon it with the knowledge of the defendant or
its servants, as the plaintiff claims, then it would seem to me to
be necessary to protect it in some way, either by fastening or by
enclosing the same. But if it was remote from places-of public
resort, or if the defendant or its servants had no knowledge of
boys going there to play upon it, so that no danger could reasonably be apprehended from it, even though it may have been in the
open prairie, I do not think such diligence would be required of
the defendant. So the degree of diligence in such a case would
greatly depend on the locality in which the, turntable might be
found. But to show that due care and diligence have been exercised in the premises the defendant called several witnesses to
testify upon the subject of diligence used by other railroad companies in matters of the same kind. The testimony upon this
subject is before you, and if you are satisfied from that that other
railroad companies, when the same are properly and carefully
managed, make their turntables, manage and leave them in a
condition such as the one where the accident is said to have
occurred was at the time, then you would not be justified in find-
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ing that the defendant was guilty of negligence. If an individual
does what prudent men generally do, there is no danger of incurring risk or loss from alleged negligence. So with railroad or
any other companies. It is true, then, that if the defendant kept
and used its turntable, as prudent and well-managed railroad
companies in other places kept and managed theirs, no liability
could attach to the defendant for the injury in question, even if
the plaintiff was without blame. This question you will determine
for yourselves upon the testimony introduced in support of it.
If you should be of the opinion from the evidence in the cause,
all taken and considered together, that the plaintiff is entitled to
recover, the only remaining question will be, what is the measure
of damages which the plaintiff may be entitled to recover ? There
is no rule by which we can arrive at the precise cash value of a
hand, a foot, or the loss of the use of either. The nature of such
a loss or such an injury is not susceptible of it. But in determining a question of this kind, you must take into consideration
the entire facts and circumstances stated in the evidence.. The
extreme youth of the plaintiff; the character and extent of the
injury to the limb; the probable effect the injury will have on the
future and further development of the limb; the permanent
nature of the disability; the great bodily pain consequent upon
the injury, and the sickness resulting therefrom. In short, every
fact and circumstance occurring since the injury was received,
that tends to throw light on the condition of the boy in the past,
present, or future, should be fairly and fully considered in order
to reach a fair estimate of damages to be awarded to him.
Let it be fully understood here and now, that whatever conclusion is reached by you it must be based upon the testimony as
you understand it. This must be taken and considered all together,
and thereafter the result ought to be as above stated.
In conclusion, I will only say that if you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of negligefice as before defined,
then your verdict should be for the defendant. On the other
hand, if you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was free
from blame, and that the negligence of the defendant caused or
contributed to the injury complained of, then your verdict should
be for the plaintiff for such sum as you in your judgment may see
proper to award him, not exceeding $15,000.

STATE v. PIKE.

Supreme Judicial Court of New Hfampshire.
STATE v. PIKE.
Mlurder committed in perpetrating a robbery is murder of the first degree,
although not committed with a deliberate and premeditated design to kill.
Under an indictment, alleging that the accused "feloniously, wilfully, and of
his malice aforethought, did kill and murder," the jury may return a verdict of
"guilty of murder in the first degree" upon proof of murder by deliberate and
premeditated killing. (DOE, J., and SIVITH, J., dissenting.)
Under such an indictment, the jury may return a verdict of "guilty of murder
in the first degree" upon proof of murder committed in perpetrating robbery.
The order in which parties shall exercise the right of challenge, is.
a matter
within the discretion of the court at the trial term.
Whether a juror is "indifferent," and whether a confession was made in consequence of inducements, are questions of fact, to be decided by the judge presiding at the trial; and no exception lies to his finding.
An "impression" formed by one called as a juror, not strong enough to be
likely to prevent a candid judgment upon a full hearing of the evidence, does not
disqualify him to be sworn as a juror.
Any witness may testify, that a person was intoxicated, or under the influence
of intoxicating liquor.
The opinion of a witness, who is not an expert, as to the sanity of a respondent,
is incompetent, although formed from observation of the respondent's appearance
and conduct. (DoE, J., dissenting.)
Whether there is such a disease as dipsomania, and whether a respondent had
that disease, and whether an act done by him was the product of such disease, are
questions of fact for the jury.
The respondent requested the court to charge, that the respondent's sanity is a
fact to be proved by the state beyond all reasonable doubt ; that there is no legal
presumption of sanity, which can have any weight with the jury as 9 matter of
law ; and, that there is no legal presumption of sanity which is a substitute for
evidence, or which, as a matter of law, affects the barden of proof in criminal
cases. The court declined so to instruct the jury ; but instructed them, "that
every person of mature age is presumed to be sane, until there is evidence tending
to show insanity, but when there is evidence coming from either side, tending to
show insanity, then the state must satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt that
the prisoner is sane." Held, that the respondent had no ground of exception.

. The defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree, upon
the following indictment:" STATE OF NEW HAmPSHIRE,

ccRockingham, ss.
"At the Supreme Judicial Court, holden at Portsmouth, within and
for the county of Rockingham aforesaid, on the third Tuesday of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixtyeight, the grand jurors for the state of New Hampshire, upon their oath,
present that Josiah L. Pike, late of Newburyport, in the county of
Essex and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, yeoman, on the 7th day of
May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-
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eight, at Hampton Falls, in the county of Rockingham aforesaid, with
force and arms, in and upon one Thomas Brown, feloniously, wilfully,
and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault-and that the said
Josiah L. Pike, with a certain axe of the value of one dollar, which he;
the said Josiah L. Pike, in both his hands, then and there had and held,
him, the said Thomas Brown, in and upon the left side of the head of
him, the said Thomas Brown, then and there feloniously, wilfully, and
of his malice aforethought, did strike and beat--giving to the said
Thomas Brown then and there, with the axe aforesaid and by the stroke
aforesaid, in the manner aforesaid, in and upon the left side of the head
of him, the said Thomas Brown, one mortal wound of the length of four
inches and of the depth of one inch, of which said mortal wound the
said Thomas Brown, from the said 7th day of May aforesaid, in the
year aforesaid, until the 13th day of the same month of May in the
year aforesaid, at Hampton Falls aforesaid, did languish, and languishing did live-on which said 13th day of May aforesaid, in the year
aforesaid, the said Thomas Brown, at Hampton Falls aforesaid, in the
said county of Rockingham, of- the wound aforesaid died.
"And so the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do say that
the said Josiah L. Pike, him the said Thomas Brown, on the said 7th
day of May aforesaid, in the year aforesaid, at Hampton Falls aforesaid, in
the said county of Rockingham, in manner and fbrm aforesaid, feloniously,
wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder, contrary
to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against
the peace and dignity of the state."
The Chief Justice, at the trial, instructed the jury that if the defendant murdered said Brown by deliberate and premeditated killing, or in
perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate robbery, the verlict should be
guilty of murder in the first degree; to which instructions defendant
excepted. A jury was obtained without calling all the jurors in attendance. The defendant peremptorily challenged sixteen. The defendant
excepted to the ruling of the court allowing the state to set aside one
juror without assigning cause, after he had been examined on oath by
counsel on both sides, and defendant's counsel had stated that they did
not object to his being sworn as a juror. It was within the knowledge
of the court that this juror was a relation of one of the defendant's
counsel. J. F. Tenney, drawn as juror, testified as follows: "I read
the reports in the newspaper, and from them derived the impression
that the defendant was guilty. Taking those reports to be true, I
should think the defendant guilty; but I pay little attention to such
reports; notwithstanding what I read in the newspaper, and the impression I received from the reading of it, I think I .could try the defendant
on the evidence without prejudice; I think I have no opinion or impression which would prevent me from trying him impartially on the
evidence."
Upon this testimony the court found, as matter of fact, that said
Tenney was indifferent, and he was sworn as a juror, and defendant
excepted.
One Leavitt, keeper of the jail to which defendant was committed by
a magistrate, testified as follows: "I've no recollection that I told him
it would be better for him if there was an accomplice found; lie may
have inferred that it would be better for him if an accomplice were
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found; I possibly may have told him so, but I have no recollection of
it; I did not at any time hold out any inducement to him to make a
confession. At the time he made the statement and before he made it,
I told him I might be obliged to testify to it, and it might go against
him."
Upon this testimony the court ruled that a confession made by defendant to Leavitt was not made in consequence of inducement held out
by Leavitt, and Leavitt was allowed to testify to such confession, and
defendant excepted.
Witnesses, not experts, were allowed to testify for the state that at
different times defendant was and was not intoxicated, and did and did
not appear to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and defendant excepted. Witnesses, not experts, called by the defendant were not
allowed to testify that from their observations of his appearance and
conduct before the alleged murder, they formed the opinion that he was
insane, and defendant excepted.
A witness called by defendant testified that a few days before the
alleged murder, the defendant came to the witness's shop in Newburyport, and said and did various things there, and that the witness shut
up his shop and started to go away. The defendant offered to prove by
this witness that the reason of his shutting up his shop and starting to
go away was, that he was afraid of defendant on account of his excited
and wild appearance and conduct on that occasion. The court excluded
the evidence and defendant excepted. Another witness called by defendant testified to the appearance and conduct of defendant at another
time when they retired to the same bed in the evening, and that witness
rose after defendant went to sleep, and went to sleep in another bed.
'The defendant offered to prove by this witness that the reason of his
going to another bed was, that he was afraid of defendant on account
of his excited and wild appearance and conduct on that occasion. The
court excluded the. evidence, and defendant excepted.
The defendant's counsel claimed that the defendant was irresponsible
by reason of a species of insanity called dipsomania. The court instructed the jury, as requested by the defendant, that if they found that
the defendant killed Brown in a manner that would be criminal and
unlawful if the defendant were sane, the verdict should be "not guilty
by reason of insanity," if the killing was the offspring or product of
mental disease in the defendant.; that neither delusion nor knowledge
of right and wrong, nor design or cunning in planning and executing
the killing and escaping or avoiding detection, nor abilitj to recognise
acquaintances, or to labor or transact business or manage affairs is, as a
matter of law, a test of mental disease; but that all symptoms and all
tests of mental disease are purely matters of fact to be determined by
the jury." I
The court also instructed the jury that whether there is such a mental
disease as dipsomania, and whether defendant had that disease, and
whether the killing of Brown was the product of such disease, were
questions of fact for the jury, to which instruction the defendant
excepted.
I These instructions were held correct in State v. Jones in the same court.

be reported in 49 N. H.)
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The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that the
sanity-the mental capacity of the defendant to commit any crime
charged in the indictment-is a fact to be proved by the state beyond
all reasonable doubt: that there is no legal presumption of sanity, which
can have any weight with the jury as a matter of law; that there is no
legal presumption of sanity which is a substitute for evidence, or which,
as a matter of law, affects the burden of proof in criminal cases. The
court declined so to instruct the jury, and defendant excepted.
The court instrudted the jury that every person of mature age is
presumed to be sane until there is evidence tending to show insanity;
but when there is evidence coming from either side tending to show
insanity, then the state must satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt
that the prisoner is sane; to which instructions the defendant excepted.
The defendant moved to set aside the verdict, the court overruled
the motion, and the defendant filed this bill of exceptions, which was
allowed and signed by the court.
Goodall and Frink, for respondent.
Attorne- General and Solicitor, for State.
SMITH, J.-"
All murder committed by poison, starving, torture, or
other deliberate and premeditated killing, or committed in perpetrating
or attempting to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, is murder
of the first degree; and all murder not of the first degree is of the
second degree :" Gen. Stat. ch. 264, sect. 1.
"If the jury shall find any person guilty of murder, they shall, by
their verdict, find also whether it is of the first or second degree :" Gen.
Stat. ch. 264, sect. 2.
"If any person shall plead guilty to an indictment for murder, the
court having cognisance of the offence shall determine the degree :"
Gen. Stat. ch. 264, sect. 3.
"In indictments for causing the death of any person, it is not necessary
to set forth the manner in which or the means by which the death of
the deceased was caused; but it is sufficient in every indictment for
murder to charge that the defendant did feloniously, wilfully, and of his
malice aforethought, kill and murder the deceased, and in every indictment for manslaughter to charge that the defendant did feloniously kill
and slay the deceased :" Gen. Stat. ch. 242, sect. 14.
1. The respondent takes the position that murder committed in perpetrating a robbery is not murder of the first degree unless committed
with a deliberate and premeditated design to kill.
This is untenable. The term "murder" in sect. 1, ch. 264, Gen.
Stat., is intended to include all kinds of unlawful killing which were
murder at common law, or in other words, "the several offences which
are included under the general denomination of murder" at common
law. At common law the killing of a man while the slayer was engaged
in perpetrating a robbery was murder.
The legislature did not intend that this species of killing should be
murder of the first degree only when accompanied by a deliberate, premeditated design to kill; for if such a design had been a necessary
ingredient to constitute murder of the first degree, the latter part of
section 1st would not have been added.
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If killing in the perpetration of a robbery was murder of the first
degree only when accompanied with such a design, it was already included under the words "other deliberate and premeditated killing,"
and nothing further need have been said about it.
Section 1st, as construed by respondent, would read substantially
thus: "All murder committed by deliberate and premeditated killing,
or committed by deliberate and premeditated killing in perpetrating
robbery, is murder of the first degree." We think the meaning of the
section better expressed by the following reading: ' All kinds of unlawful killing which constituted murder at common law, if committed by
poison, starving, torture, or other deliberate and premeditated killing,
or if committed in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate arson, rape,
robbery, or burglary, constitute under this statute murder of the first
degree; and all other kinds of unlawful killing which constituted qaurder at common law, constitute under this statute murder of the second
degree."
II. Did the indictment charge murder by deliberate and premeditated
killing, or in perpetrating robbery ? If not, the instructions to the jury
were erroneous.
The indictment is in the form prescribed by statute: Gen. Stat. ch.
242, sect. 14. This is the common-law form, and probably the only one
used in this state, either before or since the statute dividing murder
into two degrees. We presume that several persons have been executed
in this state who were convicted of murder in the first degree under a
similar indictment and upon similar instructions.
But notwithstanding these facts a plausible argument may be made
in support of the position that this indictment does not charge murder
by deliberate and premeditated killing, and that therefore proof of such
killing will not justify a verdict of murder in the first degree under this
indictment.
Prior to the statute of 23 Henry 8th all felonious homicides were of
one sort. That statute made a distinction between homicides committed
wilfully, "of malice prepensed," and those not so committed. The
former are now designated by the term "murder," the latter by "manslaughter." The practice has been in charging manslaughter to allege
the act to have been done "feloniously," or "wilfully and feloniously ;'
in charging murder to allege it to have been done "feloniously, wilfully,
and of his malice aforethought." The words "malice aforethought,"
long ago acquired in law a settled meaning somewhat different from
their popalar signification. In their legal sense these words do not
import an actual intention to kill the deceased. "Malice, although in
its popular sense it means hatred, ill-will, or hostility to another, yet in
its legal sense has a very different meaning," perhaps well expressed by
the words, "a wrong motive of any kind;" it signifies "the wilful
doing of an injurious act without lawful excuse." So "malice aforethought" "is not so properly spite or malevolence to the deceased in
particular, as any evil design in general; the didtate of a wicked, depraved, and malignant heart; un disposition afaire un male chose; and
it may be either express or implied in law :" 4 Bl. Com. 198. It "does
not mean premeditated personal hatred or revenge against the person
killed; but it means that kind of unlawful purpose which, if persevered
in, must produce mischief, such as if accompanied with those circum-
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stances that show the heart to be perversely wicked, is adjudged to be
proof of malice prepense :" Lord DENMAN, C. J., in Regina v. Tyler, 8
C. & P. 616.
Within a comparatively recent period statutes have been enacted in
this and other jurisdictions, similar to the statute now in force here,
classifying certain kinds of murder under the head of "murder of the
first degree," "and all other kinds under murder of the second degree;"
there being a wide difference in the punishments provided by the statute
for the two degrees.
The words "deliberate and premeditated killing," used in the statute,
obviously mean something more than the expression "malice aforethought" construed in its legal signification; they import an intent to
take the life of the deceased.
Since the passage of this statute can a respondent, indicted for murder "with malice aforethought," be convicted of murder in the first
degree by proof of " deliberate and premeditated killing?"
On the one hand it is urged that the stream cannot rise higher than
its fountain, the verdict cannot go beyond the indictment; that, as in an
action of debt the plaintiff shall not recover more than the demand laid
in the declaration, nor have judgment even for that demand unless his
declaration alleges such facts and circumstances as show him entitled to
it, so in criminal cases the state cannot ask the jury to find the respondent guilty of an offence with which he has not been charged; that every
circumstance which affects the punishment as provided by law must be
alleged in the indictment; that, when a statute prescribes a punishment
for larceny of property of the value of twenty dollars, more severe than
that prescribed for larceny of property under that value (see Gen. Stat.
oh. 260, sects. 3-5), the jury cannot upon the trial of an indictment
alleging larceny of property of the value of fifteen dollars find the
respondent guilty of stealing property of the value of twenty-five dollars, or, if they do, the court can only inflict the sentence prescribed for
stealing less than twenty dollars in value; that, although formerly the
premeditation did not affect the punishment, and therefore need not
have been alleged, yet, if it now affects it, the indictment must allege
it, else the jury cannot find it; that whether the two degrees of murder
are, technically speaking, distinct and different crimes or not, yet practically there is a wider gulf between them, so far as the punishment is
concerned, than between any other two kindred offences known to the
law, the difference being that between life and death.
On the other hand it is urged that the statute creates no new offence;
that murder of the first and murder of the second degree are not two
distinct crimes, the statute merely dividing murder into two degrees;
that the punishment for the higher grade of the crime is not changed;
that all which the statute does is to provide the milder punishment of
imprisonment for murder of the second degree, all murder having before
been punishable by death; that the statute only specifies certain things,
which, if found by the jury, shall require them to bring in a verdict
subjecting the prisoner to death; while, if they are not so found, the
verdict shall be one authorizing imprisonment merely.
The numerical weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the latter
view. It is sustained by decisions in Maine (State v. Verrill, 54 Me.
408); in Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v. Flanagan,7 W. & S. 415);
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in Massachusetts (Green v. Commonwealth, 12 Allen 155); in Texas
(Gehrke v. State, 13 Texas 568); in Virginia (1 Va. Cases 310, 2 Id.
387, 14 Grattan 592); and in California (People v. -lfurray, 10 Cal.
309); also by decisions of a majority of the court in New York (Fitzgerald v. People, 37 N. Y. 413, 685); and in Tennessee (Mitchell v.
State, 8 Yerger 514); and the same doctrine is reaffirmed in New York
in Kennedy v. The People, 39 N. Y. 245.
On the opposite side are the decision in State v. Jones, 20 Mo. 59
(based in great degree upon the practice in that state), and the decision
in Fonts v. State, 4 G. Greene (Iowa) 500, which has been seriously
questioned, if not overruled, in the subsequent ease of State v. Johnson,
8 Iowa 525. There .are also the dissenting opinions of PECK, J., 8
Yerger 534, and BACON, J., 37 N. Y. 685.
Wharton, in his American Criminal Law, and in his work on Homicide, lays down the rule contended for by the state, but without any
discussion. See 1 Whart. Am. Crim. Law, sect. 1115.
Bishop, in his work on Criminal Procedure, discusses the question
elaborately, and argues strongly in favor of the opposite view: 2 Bishop
on Criminal Procedure, 1st ed., sects. 562-597 ; Bishop's First Book
of the Law, sect. 401.
It may be questionable whether section 14 of chap. 242, Gen..Stat.,
prescribing the form of indictment for murder, can avail the state on
this point. That statute does not provide that the words "malice
aforethought," when used in indictments for murder, shall be construed
according to their popular meaning. In the absence of such a proviso,
these words, having acquired a definite meaning at common law, must
be understood as having this common-law meaning affixed to them when
used in the statute, although such legal meaning may differ from their
literal sense, or from their meaning when used in common conversation.
See Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N. H: 53, p. 55; Thurber v. Blackbourne, Id.
242, p. 245.
If, then, these words do not, in their legal meaning, imply a deliberate
and premeditated design to kill, can they be construed as sufficiently
charging such a design, merely because the legislature has authorized
their use in their legal meaning?
And, if they do not. charge that offence, can the legislature authorize
a conviction for that offence under this form of indictment ? The
accused has a constitutional right to have the offence plainly and substantially described in the indictment. See. 1 Bishop on Criminal Procedure, 1st ed., sects. 403-406.
A majority of the court think that, under this indictment, the
respondent can be convicted of murder in the first degree upon proof
that he murdered Brown by deliberate and premeditated killing; I am
unable to assent to this view; and I am authorized to say that Judge
DoE does not concur in the opinion of the majority on this point.
Under this indictment, the respondent can be convicted of murder in
the first degree upon proof of murder committed in the perpetration of a
robbery. The words "malice aforethought," in their legal sense, well
describe the motive necessary to be proved in such a case, which, as we
have just held, does not involve the idea of a deliberate and premeditated design to kill the deceased.
III. The constitutionality of the statute allowing the state two per-
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emptory challenges has just been affirmed in State v. Wilson, 48 N. H.
398 ; see also (Commonwealthv. Dorsey, 103 MNIass. 412.
The order in which the parties shall exercise the right of challenge
is within the discretion of the court at the trial term, and their ruling
on this point is not matter for exception. See DoE, J., in Boardman v.
Woodman, 47 N. H. 120, p. 144.
IV. The question whether Tenney was "indifferent" was one of fact
to be decided by the court at the trial. See Rollins v. Ames, 2 N. H.
350; State v. Howard, 17 Id. 171, p. 191-2; March v. Portsmouth and
Concord Railroad,19 Id. 372 ; the court are "the triers" of this question ; and their decision stands, like the verdict of a jury, to be reversed
only when it is manifestly against law and evidence. Such ground for
reversal does not exist in this case. The decision seems correct. Without attempting to review or reconcile the numerous cases on this topic
(see 1 Bishop Crim. Procedure, sect. 771, note; 2 Whart. Am. Orim.
Law, sects. 2976-3016), it is sufficient to say that we adopt the views
expressed by SHAW, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295,
p. 297-8 :"The statute intended to exclude any person who had made
up his mind, or formed a judgment in advance, in favor of either side.
Yet, the opinion or judgment must be something more than a vague impression, formed from casual conversation with others, or from reading
imperfect, abbreviated newspaper reports. It must be such an opinion
upon the merits of the question as would be likely to bias or prevent a
candid judgment upon a full hearing of the evidence. If one had formed
what in some sense might have been called an opinion, but which yet
fell far short of exciting any bias or prejudice, he might conscientiously
discharge his duty as a juror." See also PARKER, C. J., in State v.
Howard, 17 N. H. 171, p. 194-5.
V. Whether the confession by the respondent to Leavitt was made in
consequence of inducement held out by Leavitt, was a question of fact
to be decided by the judges who presided at the trial; and their finding
upon this question is a finality as much as the verdict of a jury upon a
question of fact. See State v. Squires, 48 N. H. 364. The respondent
has, therefore, no ground of exception to the admission of the confession.
VI. The evidence as to intoxication was not objectionable : People v.
Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562, and Gahaganv. Boston and Lowell Railroad
Co., 1 Allen 187, directly sustain the ruling; see also Whittierv. Franklin,'46 N. H. 23, and cases there cited; State v. Shinborn, 46 Id. 497.
Intoxication is a fact open to the observation of every man, and no
"special skill or learning" is requisite to discern it.
VII. A majority of the court are not disposed to overrule the very
recent decision in Boardmanv. Woodman, 47 !N. H. 120, that witnesses
who are not experts cannot give their opinions on the question of sanity.
Under this view of the law, the reasons which induced witnesses to
leave the respondent were properly excluded.: Probably the practical
result of a contrary ruling would be to allow the witnesses to give their
opinions on sanity. They were allowed to describe the respondent's
appearance, and his and their conduct. It was for the jury to say what
inferences should be drawn from the facts described. A similar exception was overruled in Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120; see p 121.
VIII. The court instructed the jury "that: whether there is such a
mental disease as dipsomania, and whether defendant had that disease,
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anl I hiher the killing of Brown was the product of such disease, were
que-tio,
-if' fact for the jury."
This was correct. If there are any diseases whose existence is so much
a matter of history and general knowledge that the court may properly
awsutne it in charging a jury, dipsomania certainly does not fall within
that class. The court do not profess to have the qualifications of medical experts. Whether there is such a disease as dipsonmania is a question
of science and fact, not of law.
IX. Whether the presumption of sanity is one of law or fiet (a point
,n which contradietory views have been expressed in recent cases in
this state (see BEL,. C. J., in Perkins v. Perkin.s. 39 N. I. 163, p.
170l. 171; BELLOWS. J., in State v. Bartlett, 43 Id. 224. p. 230; i,,tructi')n to jury by BARTLETT, J., in B3oardmeta v. loodman, 47 Id.
120, p. 123). or a mixed presumption of law and faet (see Sutton v.
r. 3 C. B. N. S. 87). is in many eases "a question merely verbal8.,
a qe-tion of the propriety of certain forms of expression."
If it lie merely a presumption of fact, it is, nevertheless, a presumption drawn from the coommo experience of mankind, which the court
were well warranted in calling the attention of the jury to; and it is a
presumption which the jury would inevitably have made whether the
court had referred to it or not. For these reasons we think the refusal
to charge "that there is no legal presumption which can have any
weight with the jury as matter of law," could not have materially
prejudiced the respondent.
"that there is no legal
The court also declined to instruct the jury
for evidence."'
presumption of sanity which is a substitute
We think that the presumption of sanity, whether it b a presumption
of law or of fact, is, in one sense, "a substitute for evidence." The
general presumption of sanity is sufficient prinua fi'ic evidence of that
fact to warrant a finding of sanity where no evideomee is introduced
tending to show insanity.
The other instructions requested on this point (see ,tte v. Bartlett,
43 N. I1. 224) were substantially included in the instructions given.
Exceptions overruled.
DoE, J.-Witesses. not experts, called by the defenrdant, were not
allowed to testify that, from their observations of his ,pPicaralice and
conduct before the alleged murder, they formed the opinion that he was
insane. This testimony should have been received.
In England no express decision of the point can be found, for th.
reason that such evidence has always been admitted without objection.
It has been universally regarded as so clearly competent that it seemis no
English lawyer has ever presented to any court any objection, question.
or doubt in regard to it. But in Tright v. htlthm, 5 Cl. & Fin 670,
s c. 4 Bing. N. C. 489, the question was involved in such a manner,
and the number and strength of the judicial opinions were such, as to
make that case an authority of the greatest weight in fhvur of the compietenvy of tile evidence.

In addition to that ca.e and the other English
47 N. IH. 144, arc Lowe
'ia,,mi/an v. ll'o,dimne
363; Atlorn,'!I-Cenaral v. P'arnther, 3 lhr. C. C.
Arnol L. 1I6 St. Tr. 695, 706, 707, 708, 710, 711,
VOL. X.Y.-16

,n'tlnities

cited in

v. .Illi;.,I W. El.

-41, 442; King v.
712, 713, 715: 717,
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719, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727. 728, 730, 732, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739,
742, 746, 747, 748, 750, 751, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760,
761, 762, 763; King v. Ferrers, 19 St. Tr. 885, 923, 924, 925, 926,
927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 952, 953;
King v. Frith, 22 St. Tr. 307, 313, 314, 315, 317; 5ng v. Tadfield,
27 St. Tr. 1281, 1299, 1301, 1304, 1305, 1330, 1331,1332, 1337, 1347,
1350, 1353; King v. Bellingham, Annual Register 1812, part 2, pp.
301, 307 ; King v. Bowler, Ann. Reg. 1812, part 2, pp. 309, 310; King
v. Offord, Ann. Reg. 1831, part 2, pp. 107, 108; Queen v. Oxford, 9
C. & P. 525, 317, 318; s. c. in Ann. Beg. 1840, part 2, pp. 249, 257,
259; s c. in I Townsend Modern State Trials 102, 125, 132, 133, 134,
135; Queen v. Higginson, 1 C. & K. 129, 130; Queen v. AkNaughten,
Ann. Reg. 1843, part 2, pp. 345, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357; s. a. in 1
Townsend lMod. St. Tr. 314, 347, 348, 349, 384, 385, 387, 388, 389,
390, 391, 392; Queen v. Dove, J. F. Stephen Or. Law 391, 394, 395;
396; Queen v. Mitchell, Ann. Reg. 1863, part 2, pp. 157, 159; Queen
v. Townlby, Ann. Reg. 1863, part 2, pp. 296, 302, 304; Queen v. Baker,
Ann. Reg. 1867, part 2, pp. 217, 224.
The number of English authorities is limited only by the number of
fully reported, cases in which the question of sanity has been raised.
The uniform rule in England, from the earliest times to the present,
may be wrong; but on a common-law subject like this, it is entitled to
consideration. It should be set aside, and a new rule should be established if it can be clearly shown that all the authorities of the native
land of the common law have been erroneous"from the beginning, and
in conflict with the principles of the common law, or that they are not
applicable to our institutions or the circumstances of this country. But
whoever asserts that such a condition exists, has the task of maintaining the assertion ; and that task on this question has never been
performed.
In this country the authorities are almost equally unanimous in favor
of the competency of the evidence: Lester v. .Pittsford, 7 Vt. 158;
Norse v. Crawford, 17 Id. 499; Cliftord v. Richardson, 18 Id. 620,
627; Crant v. Cram, 33 Id. 15; Crane v. Northfield, Id. 124; Cavendish v. Tro, 41 Id. 99, 108; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203; Kinne
v. Kinne, 9 Id. 102; Dun hav's Appeal, 27 Id. 192; SwifV's Ev. 111;
Stewart v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 291, 308, 309; Culver v. .Baslam,7
Barb. 314 ; De Witt v. Barley, 13 Id. 550; s. c. 9 N. Y. 371; s. a. 17
Id. 340; Delafield v. Parish,25 Id. 37, 38 ; Clapp v. Fv.dlerton, 34 Id.
190; Clark v. Sawyer, 3 Sandf. Ch. 357; Den v. Gibbons, 2 Zab. 117,
135, 136; Whitenack v. Strylcer, 1 Green Oh. 8; Sloan v. Maxwell, 2
Id. 563, 583, 584, 586, 588, 592, 594, 599, 602; In the matter of
Vanauken, 2 Stock. Ch. 192; Turner v. Cheesman, 15 N. J. Ch. 243;
Garrison v. Garrison, Id. 266; Rambler v. Tyron, 7 S. & R. 90, 92;
Irish v. Smith, 8 Id. 573, 576; Wogan v. Small, 11 Id. 141, 144;
Grabill v. Barr, 5 Penna. St. 441, 443; Wilkinson v. Pearson, 23 Id.
117, 120; Brirker v. Lightner, 40 Id. 199; Du,fleld v. Alorris, 2 Earring. (Del.) 375, 377, 385; Brooke v. Townsend, 7 Gill 1028; Stewart
v. Redditt, 3 Ald. 67,78; Stewart v. Spedden, 5 Id. 433, 446; Dorsey
v. Warfield, 7 Id. 65, 73; Weems v. Weems, 19 Id. 334, 345; Temple
v. Tayler, 1 Ien. & Munf. 476, 478; Burton v. Scott, 3 Rand. 399,
403, 404. 405; Mercer v. Kelso, 4 Grat. 106, 118; CIar!y v. Clary, 2
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Tred. 78; Hf;yward v. Hazard,1 Bay 335, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344;
Griffin v. Griffin, R. M. Charlt. 217, 218, 220, 221, 223; Potts v.
House, 6 Ga. 324; Berry v. State, 10 Id. 510, 529; Walker v. Walker.
14 Id. 242, 151 ; Roberts v. Trawick, 13 Ala. 68, 84; .orris v. State,
16 Id. 776; Florey v. Florey, 24 Id. 241, 247; Powell v. State, 25
Id. 21 ; Stubbs v. Houston, 33 Id. 355, 564; Iz re (Carmichael,36 Id.
514, 522; Gibson v. Gibson, 9 Yerg. 329; Baldwin v. State, 12 Mo.
223; Farrellv. Brennan, 32 Id. 328; Kelly v. leGuire, 15 Ark. 555.
601; Abraham v. Wilkins, 17 Ark. 292, 322; State v. Gardner,
Wright 392, 398; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio 483, 490; Doe v. Reagan,
5 lBlackf. 217; Roe v. Taylor, 45 Ill. 485; Pelanzourges v. Clark, 9
Iowa 1, 11-19, 29 ;'State v. Felter, 25 Id. 67; White v. Bailey, 10
Mich. 155, 161; Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459, 495-508; Case of
Lawrence, tried in the District of Columbia, before Judge Cranch and
two other judges, for shooting at President Jackson, 43 Niles Reg. 119;
loge v. Fisher, Pet. 0.0. 163, 165; Earrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C.
C. 580, 582, 586.
On the other side there are authorities in Maine, Massachusetts, and
Texas, which hold a contrary doctrine; but, on examination, they are
found to occupy very feeble positions.
So far as the history of the law, on this subject, has been brought to
the notice of this court, the first time the competency of this evidence
was doubted, was in the jury trial of a probate case at Cambridge, Mass.,
in 1807. The only account we have of that affair, is the report of Mr.
Tyng, who says, that the court permttted the subscribing witnesses to
the will to give their opinions of the sanity of the testator, and that,
"other witnesses were allowed to testify to the appearance of the testator, and to any particular facts from which the state of his mind might
be inferred, but not to testify merely their opinion or judgment :" Poole
v. Richardson, 3 Mass. 330. From the conspicuous and emphatic use
of the word "merely," and fromt what occurred in subsequent Massachusetts cases, there is reason to suspect that the only point ruled in this
case, was, that the witnesses were allowed to give their opinions when
they stated the particular facts from which the state of the testator's
mind was inferred by them, "but not to testify merely their opinion or
judgment." They "were allowed to testify to the appearance of the
testator;" and they could not do that without giving their opinions. It
was a ruling made hastily and probably instantaneously, without argu.nent, during a trial before a jury, at a time when the hurry of clearing
'he crowded dockets of Massachusetts, gave no opportunity for deliberation.
If the court had been aware that this ruling overturned all the
authorities and the uniform practice of England and America from the
beginning of the common law to that day, it is not to be presumed that
the ruling would have been made without a formal opinion reduced to
writing by some member of the court, formally delivered, and formally
reported, giving some reason for the innovation. If they had been
conscious of the novel and revolutionary character of the precedent;
they would not have introduced it so summarily and inconsiderately.
This was not the only mistake made at Nisi Prius. In the previous
month, in the trial of another probate case, when the only issue was
upon the sanity of a testator, and the formal execution of the will was
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therefore not in question, the court refused to allow two of the subscribing witnesses of the will to testify because the third witness was
not produced: Chase v. Lincoln, 3 Mass. 236. Nor are these the only
peculiarities in the precedents of that state. At the trial of another
probate case, the physicians who attended the testatrix in her last sickness were asked whether, in their opinion, she was sane. Objection
was made to the competency of any opinion. The court ruled that the
attending physicians might give their opinions, but state the particular
circumstances or symptoms from which they drew their conclusions:
Hathorn v. King, 8 Mass. 371. And in Didcinson v. Barber, 9 Id.
225, it was held on that ground, that certain depositions of physicians
had been rightly excluded. In Cnommonwealth v. Rich, 14 Gray 335,
337, it was held, as matter of law, that a physician of thirty years'
practice, who had testified that he had made the subject of mental
disease a study, but not a special study, and had had the usual expe-,
rience of practicing physicians on the subject, could not be questioned
upon a hypothetical case stated in the usual manner. These cases show'
a peculiar and exceptional system of practice on these subjects, which
has never prevailed in this state.
In Buckminster v. Perry, 4 Mass. 593, "two or three witnesses were
of opinion that the testator was much broken and very forgetful about
the time the will was made." Instead of rejecting this evidence, the
court charged the jury "that the evidence given by the appellants to
invalidate the will deserved but little consideration." In Needham v.
Ide, 5 Pick. 510, the jury were instructed that the "1mere opinions of
other witnesses" than those who subscribed the will, "were no'Z competent evidence, and were not entitled to any weight, further than they
were supported by the facts and circumstances proved on the trial."
These witnesses gave their opinions, "without being asked ;" -objection
was not made to their opinions; their opinions were not rejected at the
time they were given, nor absolutely excluded from the consideration
of the jury by the charge of the court. But in Commonwealth v. Wilson, 1 Gray 337, 339; at Nisi Prius, in _fubb.ll v. Bissell, 2 Allen 196,
200, by a dictum; and in Commonwealth v. Fairbanks, Id. 511, in a
per curiam decision, it was held that the incompetency of the opinions
of non-experts was not an open question in Massachusetts. The court
merely refused to investigate the question. In this abrupt and unsatisfactory manner, without any consideration from first to last, has this
exception become established in that state. Of the four judges reported
as present at the October Term 1807, at Cambridge, we do not know
who were present at the trial of Poolev. Richardson. The next year, at
Cambridge, when Ch.J. PARsoNs charged the-jury in Buclcminster v.
Perry, witnesses were allowed to testify that, in their opinion, "the
testator was much broken and very forgetful;" and this evidence was
not excluded from the consideration of the jury. In Needham v. Ide
no opinion of the court is reported; but the reporter says that the court
overruled an objection taken to the instruction given to the jury that
the mere opinions "were not entitled to any weight further than they
were supported by the facts and circumstances proved on the trial."
After that, at Nisi Prius, and in a dictum, and in a per curiam decision,
the court held themselves concluded by their own precedents.
The only judge in Massachusetts who appears to have deliberated on
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the sulject. gave his judgment against the peculiar practice of' that
state. In Baxter v. Abbott, 7 Gray 71. 79, Judge TIIO.1AS says: A
All
lawyers know how difficult it is to try issues of sanity with the restrictions as to matters of opinion already existing; how hard it is to make
witnesses distinguish between matters of flict and opinion on this subjeet; between the conduct and traits of character they observe and the
impression which that conduct and those traits create, or the mental
ctelusion to which they lead the mind of the observer. If it were a
new question I should be disposed to allow every witness to give his'
,,pinion subject to cross-exanination, upon the reasons upon which it is
ba~ed, his degree of intelligence and his means of observation."
The eounties of -Massachusetts which became the state of' Maine
thirteen years after the exception was introduced in Pooe v. i'ichardswi. did not abandon their practice on that point, as they did not
abandon the general system of practice which had grown up with them
while they were a part of' 3assaclmusetts. For thirteen years the excepltion had the same authority, and was administered by the same court
in Essex and in York. As it was never examined in Massachusetts on
the south, so it has never been examined in Massachusetts on the east:
Ware v. lrare, 8 Greenlf. 42, 54, 55, 56; 1l1man v. Gould, 47 Me.
159. It is equally regarded in both as an inherited peculiarity for
which no one is responsible. Its position as an authority was not materially strengthened by the division of the state.
In Gohrke v. State, 13 Texas 568, it was summarily held, without
any citation of authority or consideration of principle, that it would
have been improper to receive as evidence the vague, indefinite expression of a witness that the prisoner looked like or acted as an insane
.person.
Thus stand the precedents of other jurisdictions at present, so far as
they have been brought to the notice of this court; Massachusetts,
Maine, and Texas on one side, the rest on the other; and no attempt in
either of the three states to justify their peculiar exception. If this
amounts to a conflict among the authorities it must be regarded as
inconsiderable.
In many of the cases in which the opinions of ordinary witnesses
have been received the question has been fully considered, and their
competency established on solid ground. "Testimony of opinion may
be given where, from the general and indefinite nature of the inquiry,
it is not susceptible of direct proof. Thus upon a question of insanity
witnesses, not professional men, may be permitted to give their ol)iniou
in connection with the facts observed by them. But this evidence is
always confined to those who have observed the facts, and is never
permitted where the opinion of the witness is derived from the representation of others. Upon a question of insanity, for instance, witnesses
who have observed the conduct of the patient, and been acquainted with
his conversation, may testify to his acts and .ayings, and give the result
of their observation ; but where mere opinion is required upon a given
state of facts, that opinion is to be derived from pr,,t-ssioial men:
Lfster v. Pittsford. 7 1-t. 158. 1(1. " The law is well s-ttle,1. and
especially in this state, that a witness may give his opinion in evidence
in connection with the facts upon which it is founded. and as derived
from them, though he could not be allowed to give his opinion founded
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upon facts proved by other witnesses :" Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499,
502. "Where mere opinion is required upon a given state of facts not
connected with the personal observation of the witness, that opinion is'
to be received from professional men alone :" Cram v. cram, 33 Vt.
15, 18. These extracts are a sufficient answer to the objection made
against some of the authorities that they require the witness to state
facts as well as opinion. The objection is as invalid as it would be if
made against the admission of opinions as to physical health. A withess cannot testify that in his opinion the defendant was sick or well,
without first showing that he had an opportunity of forming an opinion
from facts observed by himself. If a witness, not an expert, is first
asked whether, in his opinion, A. was sane or insane at a certain time,
the witness would not be allowed to answer the question. It must first
appear that his opinion is formed upon his own observations and not
upon the testimony of other witnesses, or upon hearsay, or upon a
hypothetical case. If his opinion is formed upon the testimony of other
witnesses the jury have as good an opportunity as the witness to form
an opinion; if it is formed upon hearsay it is mere indirect proof of
hearsay; of a hypothetical case the jury can form an opinion as well as
a non-expert witness. But if the opinion of the witness is formed upon
his own observations he had a better opportunity to form an opinion
than the jury can have from a description of the acts and words of the
person whose sanity is in question; because such a description cannot
generally convey any adequate idea of the signs of sanity or insanity as
they appear to an observer. It is necessary as far as possible that the
impression produced by the acts and words should be conveyed to the
jury, and it cannot generally be conveyed by a mere description or
recital of them; therefore the opinions of observers constitute one of
the classes of testimony known in law as the best evidence; not the best
because it happens to be the only available evidence in a particular case,
but the best because it belongs to one of the best species of evidence
usually available-the best in the nature of things-the best by reason
of "the general and indefinite nature of the inquiry, and the difficulty
of producing direct proof of a mere mental condition :" Crane v. Northfield, 33 Vt. 124, 125. "The best testimony ihe nature of the case
admits of ought to be adduced; and on the subject of insanity, in my
judgment, it consists in the representation of facts, and of the impressions which they made :" Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203.
"The judgment which we form as to the mental condition of an
acquaintance depends as much upon his looks and gestures, connected
with his conversation and conduct, as upon the words and actions themselves, and yet it would be a hopeless task for the most gifted person
to clothe in language all the minute particulars ith their necessary
accompaniments and qualifications which have led to the conclusion
which he has formed :" DENIo, J., in De Witt v. Barley, 9 N. Y. 371,
389, 390. No mere description of the wrinkles of the.face, of the tone
of the voice, or the color of the hair, would be likely to convey any very
accurate impression as to the precise age of the person described. The
case of McKee v. Nelson, 4 Cow. 355, is an example belonging to the
same class. That was an action for breach of promise of marriage, and
a witness who knew the plaintiff, and had observed her conduct and
deportment toward the defendant, was permitted to testify whether in
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her opinion the plaintiff was sincerely attached to him-a fact which it
is plain could be proved in no other way. Trelawnel v. Coleman, 2
Stark. 191, is another case of the same kind. There in an action for
criminal conversation a witness who was acquainted with the parties
was permitted to give her opinion as to the degree of affection entertained by the wife for her husband. * * * To me it seems a plain
proposition that upon inquiries as to mental imbecility arising from age,
it will be found impracticable in many cases to come to a satisfactory
conclusion without receiving to some extent the opinions of witnesses.
How is it possible to describe in words, that combination of minute
appearances upon which a judgment in such cases is formed ? The
attempt to try such a question excluding all matter of opinion would, in
most cases, I am persuaded, prove entirely futile. * * * A witness
can scarcely convey any intelligible idea upon such a question' without
infusing into his testimony more or less of opinion. Mental imbecility
is exhibited in part by attitude, by gesture, by the tones of the voice,
and the expression of the eye and the face. Can these be described in
language so as to convey to one not an eye-witness an adequate conception of their force? * * * It certainly strikes me that few questions can be suggested, about which it is possible to raise a doubt, which
are more conclusively settled by authority than that under consideration.
* * * This court itself, since the former decision in this case, has,
upon a question strictly analogous, unanimously established a different
rule. I refer to the case of The People v. Bastwood, 14 N. Y. 562.
Upon the trial of that case a witness was asked whether at the time of
the homicide the prisoner was intoxicated ? This question was objected
to and excluded upon the ground that it called for the opinion of the
witness. Exception was taken to this ruling, and upon that exception
the case was brought to this court, where it was unanimously held that
the evidence ought to have been received, and a new trial was granted
for that among other reasons. The admissibility of the evidence was
there placed upon the precise ground which has been assumed here.
viz., that the appearances which indicate intoxication cannot be so perfectly described in words as to enable persons not eye-witnesses to judge
with accuracy on the subject. The questions in that case and in this
are in principle identical, and opinions cannot be held inadmissible in
the present case without virtually overruling that of Eastwood :" De
Witt v. Barley, 17 N. Y. 340, 344, 348, 350, 852.
"A witness may state facts, may give the look of the eye, and the
action of the man, but unless he is permitted to express an opinion, he
cannot convey to the mind distinctly the condition of the man that such
acts and looks portray :" In the matter of rananken, 2 Stock. Ch. 186,
192. How can a witness "give the look of the eye," without giving an
opinion? "The opinion of a witness as to the sanity of a person
depends for its weight, on the capacity of the witness to judge, and his
opportunity:" Burton v. Scott, 3 Rand. 399, 403. "And so it is in
regard to questions respecting the temper in which words have been
spoken, or acts done. Were they said or (lone kindly or rudely-in
good humor or in anger; in jest or in earnest? What answer can be
given to these inquiries if the observer is not pernitted toi.-tae his impression or belief? Must a fac simile be attempted so a to bring befbre
the jury the very tone, look, gestures, and manner, and let thcnm collect
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thereupon the disposition of the speaker or agent? * * * Unquestionably before a witness can be received to testify as to the fact of capacity,
it must appear that he had an adequate opportunity of observing and
judging of capacity. But so different are the powers and the habits of
observation in different persons, that no general rule can be laid down
as to what shall be deemed a sufficient opportunity of observation, other
than it has in fact enabled the observer to form a belief or judgment
thereupon. So it is in the analogous case of handwriting. If a witness
declares that he has seen the party write, whether it has been once only
or a thousand times, this is enough to introduce the inquiry, whether he
believes the paper produced to be the party's handwriting. His belief
is evidence, the weight of which must depend lupon a consideration of
all the circumstances under which it was formed :" Clary v. Clary, 2
Ired. 78. Judge REDFIELD says of the decisions in C0a~, v. Clary,
"The learned judge shows with great ability and abundant success, in
in our judgment, that the rule here adopted, is the only one consistent
with principle": 1 Eedfield on Wills 143, n. 16.
"A careful daily observer of a person feigning madness, would witness
innumerable acts, motions and expressions of countenance, which, with
the attendifig incidents and circumstances, would conclusively satisfy
him of the fictitious character of the pretended malady, but which he
could never communicate to a jury or scientific man, so as to give them
a fair conception of their real importance. From poverty of language,
these facts, should a witness attempt to detail them, would necessarily
be mixed up with opinions general or partial, in spite of his best efforts
to avoid it. There are things well known to all persons, which our language only enables us to express by words of comparison-such are the
peculiar features of the face indicating an excitement of the passions,
affections and emotions of the mind, as hope, fear, love, hatred, pleasure,
pain, &c. Testimony affirming the existence or absence of either of
these, is but a matter of opinion. So the statement of the fact that a
man's whole conduct is natural, is but the opinion of the witness, formed
by comparing the particular conduct spoken of, with the acts of the past
life of the individual. It would hardly be claimed that such evidence
should be excluded, yet it is equivalent to an opinion that the person is
sane :" Clark v. iState, 12 Ohio 483, 490. It must appear that "the
facts upon which it is based, have come under his own observation :"
Doe v. Reagan, 5 Blackf. 217. The subject is fully considered in Beaubien v. (Wcotte, 12 Mich. 459, 495-508, and other eases.
Objection has been made to some of the cases in which it has been
said that mere opinions were slight evidence. This has been said in
some chancery cases, in which the judge passing upon fact as well as
law, has expressed his opinion of the weight of !certain testimony as a
matter of fact within his power to decide. In other eases tried by jury,
judges have expressed their opinions of the weight of this evidence as
they were accustomed to express their opinions of the weight of other
evidence. The practice, having been firmly fixed and universal, has
often been as visible in the decisions of the court as in summing up the
evidence to the jury. It embraces all evidence alike, and has no bearing upon the competency of particular testimony, which is the point now
before us. The practice is obsolete in this state, but it is settled by
authority that, at common law, the judge may give the jury his opinion
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of the weight of any part or of the whole of the evidence-with this
limitation. that he is not to give such opinion as imperative upon the
jury-they are to understand that they are the judges of the facts:
2 lale's [list. Corn. L. 147; King v. Fisher, 1 St. Tr. 395, 402; King
v. Clleuder dtol., 6 St. Tr. 687, 7410; Kin v. Keach, 6 St. Tr. 701.
706, 709; King v. Green et al., 7 St. Tr. 159, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218.
219 ; Kinty v. (Jolledgje, 8 St. Tr. 550, 713, 726; Kitty v. Hardy, 24 St.
Tr. 1362, 1363, 1383; Brembridge v. Osborne, 1 Stark. 374; Petty v.
Anderson, 3 Bing. 170, 171, 172, 173; Solarte v. JXelville, 7 B. & C.
430, 435 ; Davidson v. Stanley, 2 IM[.
& G. 221; (Oamad
1 v. Rowe, 6
M. G. & S. 861, 893; Doe v. Stricklatd. 8 Id. 743; 1'ennell v. Dawson, 18 Com. B. 355, 370; s. c.36 Eng. L.& Eq. 431. 440; AttorneqGeneral V. ,od,3icClcl. & Y. 286; Sutton v. Sadler, 3 Com. B. (N.
S.) 87, 98, 101, 103; Queen v. Townleey, Ann. Reg. 1863, part 2, pp.
306-309; Dulberj v. 6'unnihg, 4 T. R. 651, 652; 7Y:rwlitt v. llynne.
3 B. & Ald 556, 560, 561; Rex v. Burdett, 4 Id. 131. 167; 1 Am. L.
R1ev. 59; Car'er v. .ackson, 4 Pet. 1, 80; Garrard v. Re nols, 4
How. (U. S ) 123; Hlarrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. 0. 580; Phillips
v. Kingfield. 19 3le. 375; Cunninghan v. Batclheler, 32 Id. 316;
N1dtthnq v. Herbert, 37 N. 1I. 346, 355; Buckminster v. Pews,4 Iass.
593. 594; Commoniwealth v. Child, 10 Pick. 252, 256; Cart v. Lowell,
19 Id. 25; Davis v. Jenney, 1 Met. 221; J1hiton v. 0. C.I Co., 2 Id.
1; Eddy v. Gray, 4 Allen 435; State v. J.ynoitl, 5 It. I. 295; F. B.
Church v. Rouse, 21 Conn. 160, 167; 7 .Y F . Co. v. lMu~eldn, 12
Johns. 513; Gar(nzer v. Picket, 19 Wend. 186; Lansing v. Russell, 13
Barb. 521; Ifunt v. Bennett. 4 B. D. Smith 647; Bulhele/y v. Ketellas,
4 Sandf. 450; Grove v. Donadson. 15 1Penna. 12S; Oyster v. Longnecker, 16 Id. 269; Stolard v. McIlwain, 7 Rich. 525; Still v. Glass,
1 Ga. 475.
What was the New Hampshire rule as to the competency of the evidence, before the decision of Bocrdniau v. lloodman ?
In May 1811, State v. Georyr Rytan was tried in (heshire, before
LIVER.OELE, Ch.J., and STF.ELE, J. The Attorney-General appeared for
the state, and Chamberlain, Ilubbard and Vose for the defendant. The
defence was insanity. Of non-expert witnesses called by the state, one
testified that at the trial befbre the magistrate, the defendant " wished
an adjournment of his examination-appeared to argue his motion for
it like a man of understanding and discretion ;" another testified that
lie " had no idea from what he saw of the defendant * * * that he was
any way deranged-the prisoner then appeared to have the full use of
his reason ;" another testified that the defendant "appeared to be perfectly in posses.ion of his faculties * * * no appearance of derangement." Of non-expert witnesses called by the defendant, one testified
that the defendant conducted on one occasion "like a man without
sense;" another testified that in the morningi of a certain day. the
dcbndant

"

was perfectly rational-in the afternoon, became wild;"

another confirmed the last; another testified that the d,-fbhlant "ap-

peared rational." Non-expert witnes.es gave their opinions fi'el!y
without objection, -and it is evident that the counsel and the court
undi-tood such (vidence to be competent. Jud-e I
i.vioE, in
sunmming up the testimony, particularly named the witneiw:cs. who, to
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use his own words, "testify that in their opinion he had not the use of
his reason :" Pamp. Report of State v. Ryan.
In State v. Farmer,tried in 1821, before RIcHARDsoN, Ch. J., and
WOODB3URY and GREEN, JJ., a witness testified that the defendant had
said he would kill the deceased. On cross-examination he was asked
if he thought the defendant in earnest, and he answered in the negative
without objection. The charge of the court shows that it was understood that this evidence was competent: Pamp. Report of State v.
Farmer.
In October 1830, State v. Corg was tried in Cheshire, before RICHARDSON, Oh. J., and GREEN and HARRIS, JJ.

Handerson, Wilson,

and Chamberlain, the Solicitor, appeared for the state, and Woodbury,
Hubbard, and Joel Parker for the defendant. The trial was reported
by Joel Parker. The defence was insanity. The first witness called
for the defence, was the defendant's brother, not an expert. He was
asked if his father was sane. "The Solicitor objected to the question,
and cited Poole et al. v. Richardson,3 Mass. 380, and other authorities
to show that the opinion of the witness could not be received in evidence." What the "other authorities" were, we know only from the
fact that, at that time, there were no such authorities in the world outside of the original territory of the state of Massachusetts-the slight
extension of the peculiar practice of Massachusetts beyond that territory,
being a very recent affair. Notwithstanding the objection explicitly
urged and supported by Massachusetts precedent, Corey's brother was
allowed to testify "His father is crazy," and his sister "is wild as a
hawk." At least six other non-expert witnesses testified to their opinions that various relatives of the defendant had been insane. One
testified that thd defendant was not insane at the time in question. One
testified that the defendant looked and acted like a crazy person. The
court asked one witness if the defendant, on a certain occasion, appeared
rational; and received an affirmative answer. Many non-expert witnesses, on the part of the state, testified that they had known the defendant, and had never known of his being insane. One testified there
"was one time when he saw him out-cannot say whether he had been
drinking or not." Several testified that they hd "never known of his
being deranged except from liquor." We are informed by the reporter
of the case that his report of the charge given to the jury by Judge
RICHARDSON, was submitted to, and revised by, Judge RICHARDSON
himself before publication. The charge shows that it was not doubted
that the opinions were competent. Judge RICI ARDSON expressly said
that the opinions formed the day before the homicide, by persons in a
situation which enabled them to judge, were "entitled to great weight."
Here was the first attempt made to introduce into this state, the Massachusetts exception, which was then twenty-three years old. The total
failure of the attempt; the citation, consideration, and rejection of the
Massachusetts cases; the admission of the opinions; the question put
to one of the witnesses by the court; and the declaration of Judge
RICHARDSON that the opinions formed the day before the homicide,
were entitled to great weight, notwithstanding the Massachusetts authorities cited to show they were not admissible, render this a case of the
very highest authority. To cite the Massachusetts cases as in conflict
with State v. Gorey, is, in this state, as unavailing as it.
would be to
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cite Gre]g v. Wyqman, 4 Cush. 332, as in conflict with Woodman v.
Hubbard,25 N. H. 67, 76, 77, where Gregg v. ]Vynman was held not to
be law. The cases in Maine, as we have seen, cannot be regarded as
anything else than Massachusetts authority. And thus all existing
precedents which have been cited from other jurisdictions as in conflict
with Sate v. ("orey, are disposed of, except the Texas case. As no
authority was cited and no ground stated for the decision of the latter
case, we could not be expected to follow it, and to overthrow the overwhelming mass of English and American authorities including those of
our own state, without some urgent reason for so doing.
At the August term 1832, in Rockingham, held by Judge GREEN
and Judge HARRIS, the case of Eamblett v. ilamblett was tried.
The appellee "offered in evidence the deposition of Mary Palmer in
which she testified, among other things, that on the day of the execution
of the will, she was at the house of the testator, and that - his discourse
*as satisfactory to her.' To this part of the testimony, the appellant
objected. The evidence was admitted, but the court, in their instructions to the jury, directed them not to rely upon any evidence of opinion
as to the sanity or insanity of the testator, except what was derived from
the testimony of the subscribing witnesses to the will." Questions
raised at the trial were decided December 1833, when the court consisted of RICHARDSON, GREEN, PARKER, and UPHAM. Judge PARKER,

delivering the opinion of the court, said that the whole force and effect
of some of the evidence relating to certain persons was "to show their
opinions that the testator was sane. * * * It could be used only to show
that they treated the will as valid and binding on them, and that the
inference therefore was, that they were heretofore of opinion that the
sanity of the testator could not be questioned. In this view, it would
seem to stand upon the same ground as the matter which forms another
objection on the part of the appellant, which is to the admission of the
testimony of Mary Palmer that she had a conversation with the testator
on the day of the execution of the will, and that ' his discourse was
satisfactory to her.' This is wholly immaterial unless it be as evidence
of the opinion of the witness that the testator was sane. But, the case
finds that the judge expressly directed the jury not to rely upon any
evidence of opinion as to the sanity or insanity of the testator, except
what was derived from the testimony of the subscribing witnesses to the
will. On the supposition that this testimony of Mary Palmer to matter
of opinion, or rather to matter from which her opinion of sanity is to be
inferred, was incompetent-which is not conceded-if sufficiently connected with facts-the question arises whether this furnishes any ground
for a new trial, the court having thus directed the jury."
After deciding that question, and holding that if the evidence had
been incompetent, the exclusion of it after it had been received, would
obviate the objection made to its admission, Judge PARY.R said, "As
to the direction of the judge, relative to evidence of opinion, it may be
proper to remark that we do not intend to be understood as establishing
this as the rule. The weight of authority seems to be in favor of admitting the opinions of others than the witnesses to the will, if connected
with evidence of the facts upon which those opinions are founded : 3
Stark. Ev. 1707 in notes; Grante v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203; vide
also Hathorn v. King, 8 Mass. 371; Buclkminster v. Per'j, 4 Id. 594;
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Lowe v. Jollife, 2 W. Black. 365. It remains to be considered whenever the question shall directly arise whether this is not the most eligible
and proper course in questions of this nature; but upon this matter it is
not now necessary to make a decision": Hamblett v. Hfamblett, 6 N. 11.
333, 336, 344, 349. This is a strong intimation that the doctrine of
State v. Cores had not been, and was not likely to be, abandoned.
In September 1834, State v. Prescottwas tried in Merrimack, before
Judge RICHARDSON and Judge PARKER. George Sullivan, AttorneyGcneral, and John Whipple, Solicitor, appeared fbr the state; Ichabod
Bartlett and Charles H. Peaslee for the defendant. The defence was
insanity. A large number of non-expert witnesses testified to their
opinions of the sanity or the insanity of the defendant and some of his
relatives; and no objection was made to the competency of the opinions.
The case was sharply and strenuously contested on each side; it was
tried according to the strict rules of law as then understood ; the distinguished counsel on both sides, insisted 'upon a rigid observance of
those rules; they waived no objection that occurred to them; nothing
was yielded to courtesy, convenience, or humanity; in no case tried in
this state, since that time, has there been a greater display of zeal, acuteness, and power on the part of counsel. It is reasonably certain that if
it had been supposed to be doubtful whether the opinions of non-experts
were admissible, objection would have been made to them. Those opinions were argued by the counsel, and considered by the court and jury
as evidence; and there is no reason to suspect that any one engaged in
the trial, thought they were not evidence.
In addition to these precedents, we know, upon the most authentic
information, that, down to the time when Judge PARKER left the bench
in 1848, he did not understand that the early New Hampshire practice
with which he had been familiar in State v. Core&, and State v. Prescott,
and of which he had expressed his approval in Hamblett v. .amblett,
had been abolished, and the contrary Mlassachusetts practice established
in its place. After the delivery and publication of his opinion in Hamblett v. Hfamblett, it is not probable that he would assent to a silent
reversal of the doctrine of State v. Corey, or allow it to be reversed
without some reason for or against the innovation, being put on record.
This brings us down to a recent period. Whatever uncertainty there
is, has arisen since Judge PARKER presided in this court. In 1848,
when he retired from the bench and removed from the Atate, the decision in Texas had not been made, but the Massachusetts exception
had been disapproved in Hamblett v. .Hamblett,and rejected in State v.
Ryan, State v. Core,, and State v. Pescott. Down to 1848 there is no
doubt that the doctrine of Poole v. Richardson vas not the law of this
state. This is a matter as to which we have dates. The doctrine of
Poole v. Richardson was not brought from England with the body of
the common law; it was a ruling first made in this country in the
present century; it had not gained a foothold in this state twenty-one
years ago, and was never recognised in our decisions until 1865.
After Judge PARKER left the state, and before the trial of Boardman
v. Woodman, the question of sanity was tried in a few cases, and so far
as any practice can be said to have grown up in those few cases in those
seventeen years, it grew into conformity to the 'Massachusetts exception.
So far as it amounted to anything, it was a silent, unauthentic growth,
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and it is very easily explained. No judge remained on the bench who
had participated in the decision of Hanblettv. Ilambleft, or in the trial
of the early cases. The significant observations of Judge PARKER, in
Hamblett v. Ramblett, were not kept prominently before the profession
by any head-note or digest. They were enveloped in a case of eighteen
pages, and in a part of it not likely to be often if ever read; they were
entirely overlooked or forgotten. The pamphlet reports of State v.
Rya, State v. Core, and State v. Prescott were scarce, seldom if ever
read and substantially unknown ; and the surviving counsel who had
been engaged in those trials were no
longer on active duty at our bar,
and had no occasion to remonstrate against the
change of our practice.
The
nassachusetts exception prevailed in the territory adjoining us on
the south and east. The Massachusetts reports were used more than
any others exept our own. The legal treatises referring to this subject,
in most common use among us, were written or edited by Massachusetts
men who were not aware that the doctrine of Poole v. Richardson was
a peculiarity of their state, and who stated the assachusetts exception
to be the common law, as they erroneously supposed it was. Greenleaf
on Evidence and Massachusetts editions of Jarman on Wills exercised
a potent influence in the introduction of that great mistake : 1 Greenl
Ev. § 440; 1 Jarman on Wills 77, lass. ed. In the second and subsequent Massachusetts editions of Jarman, the third chapter of the
first volume of the English edition was omitted, and a new chapter by
the Massachusetts editor was inserted in its place. In the text of this
new chapter the editor gives the peculiar local rule of Poole v. Richardson, as if it were common law. It was stated in the advertisement to
the second edition that the editor had added this new chapter to the
original text; but the authorship of this chapter wais very likely to
escape observation in the use generally made of the book.
There was one peculiarity in our practice which opened the way for
the introduction of the Massachusetts exception. In 1826, wheu the
court consisted of RIeTARDsoN, GREEN, and HARRIS, the case of
Rochester v. Chester, 3 N. H. 349, was decided, in which Judge RicirARDSON, being an inhabitant of Chester, did not sit. It was there held
that witnesses could not testify their opinions of the value of land.
Trhe decision of GREEN, J., and HARRIS, J., was reported
In Peterloro' v. Jaffrey, 6 N. II. 462, in which case Judge PARKER did not
sit, the exception introduced in Rochester v. Chester was followed; it
was then necessarily applied to sleds and all other property, and it continued in force (Loow v. Railroad,45 N. H. 370, 383) until its excessive inconvenience in practice could no longer be endured, and it was
rescinded by the legislature: Gen. Stat. ch. 209, sect. 24. After Judge
BELL came to the bench the court were never unanimous against restoring the common-law rule which admitted opinions of the value of
property, but in accordance with the general usage, no dissent was
publicly expressed.
The exception introduced by Judge GREEN and Judge HARRIS in
Rochester v. Chester was peculiar to this state; it sccns nevr to have
prevailed anywhere else in the whole world: 1 lledfiel on W\'ills 137,
3 c.; Crane v. N17orthfitll, 33 Vt. 126; (lark v. B, r'd. 1) N. Y. 183;
De 11itt v. Barley, 17 Id 342, 343; Kellogg v. Kruser, 14 S. & R.
137. 142; Laney v. Bra rd, 4 Rich. 1; Beaubien v. (icotte, 12
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3ich. 507. Not only was it a local peculiarity, it was a troublesome
and mischievous one. Unless the jury could'have a view of the property in question they could not generally have satisfactory evidence of
its value, and if they could have a view of it their information would
generally have been greatly increased by the opinions of persons familiar
with the property and with circumstances aftcting its value. It was
unjust; it often resulted in excessive, often insufficient damages. It
was expensive and annoying; the parties were compelled to summon a
greater number of witnesses than would have been necessary if their
opinions could have been taken, and the process of obtaining from them
such testimony as they were allowed to give, and excluding their
opinions, was difficult and tedious. It was inconsistent with itself.
Before the decision of Low v. Railroad, in 1864, witnesses were
allowed to testify that other similar property had been actually sold for
a certain price: Hackett v. B. 0.& A. Railroad,35 N. ]E.390, 392,
398; their statement of the similarity of property involved their
opinion, as was suggested by Judge WILCOX in Whipple v. Walpole,
10 N. H. 131, and by Judge PARKER in Beard v. Kirk, 11 Id. 401.
The witness who was not permitted to say that he thought 'a certain
horse was worth more or less than a thousand dollars, was permitted to
give his opinion of the age, size, weight, form, speed, strength, endurance, health, appetite, docility, timidity, and general disposition of the
horse. He was permitted to give his opinion on these points, because
his statement of facts without opinion was not the best evidence; and
for the same reason the common law allows him to give his opinion of
the value. The great legal objection to Rochester v. Chester is, that it
was a violation of the elementary rule of law' which allows the best
evidence to be given of which the case in its nature is susceptible.
Opinions are the best evidence "where language is not. adapted to
convey those circumstances on which the judgment must be formed :"
Clark v. Baird, 9 N. Y. 183, 196. Opinions are the best evidence
when "from the nature of the subject to be investigated it cannot be so
described in language as to enable persons not eye-witnesses to form an
accurate judgment in regard to it. * * * No description of a sled
could enable a jury to judge as accurately of its value as one who had
an opportunity of examining it. Two sleds may be made of the same
materials and the same dimensions, and the value of one be three times
that of the other; as two horses may have legs of the same length,
heads of the same size, and hair of the same color, and yet be widely
different in value :" De Witt v. Barley, 17 N. Y. 342, 343.
Opinions, like other testimony, are competent in the class of cases in
which they are the best evidence, as when a mere description without
opinion would generally convey a very imperfect idea of the force,
meaning, and inherent evidence of the things described. Like other
testimony, opinions are incompetent in the class of cases in which they
are not the best evidence, as when they are founded on hearsay, or on
evidence from which the jury can form an opinion as well as the witness. A rule that opinions are or are not evidence must necessarily be
in conflict with the rule which admits the best evidence. A constant
observer of the trial of cases examining the testimony for the purpose
of ascertaining how many opinions are received and how many rejected,
will find ten of the former as often as he finds one of the latter; and if
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he is very critical lie will find the ratio much greater than that.
Opinhms ale constantly given. A case can hardly be tried without
them. Their number is so vast and their use so habitual that they are
not noticed as opinions distinguished from other evidence.
"It has been said that a witness must not be examined in chief as to
his belief or Irrs,sioa,but only as to his knowledge of the fact, since
judgment must be given secundum allegata et probata; and a man
cannot be indicted for perjury who falsely swears as to his persuasion
or belief. As fr as regards mere belief or persuasion which does not
rest upon a sufficient and legal foundation, this position is correct; as
where a mau believes a fact to be true merely because he has heard it
said to be so; but with respect to persuasion or belief, as founded on
facts within the actual knowledge of the witness, the position is not
true. On questions of identity of persons and of handwriting it is
every day's practice for witnesses to swear that they believe the person
to be the same, or the handwriting to be that of a particular individual,
although they will not swear positively; and the degree of credit to be
attached to the evidence is a question for the jury. With regard to the
second objection it has been decided that a man who falsely swears that
he thinks or believes, may be indictd for perjury :" 1 Stark. Ev. 153.
The cases of identity of persons and things and of handwriting
having been named in the English books, as illustrations of the competency of opinions, those cases were supposed to be peculiar exceptions
to the general rule, whereas they are mere instances of the application
of the general rule which admits the best "evidence. This general,
natural, fundamental, comprehensive, and chief rule of evidence was
gradually ignored, and special and artificial rules were substituted; or
if there was not an absolute substitution, there was such a removal of
emphasis fron the general rule to the special ones that the former lost
the overshadowing influence and control which belong to it. Entire
systems of law. theology, medicine, and philosophy are easily changed
by a tranfer of emphasis from one point to another. To say the least,
the emphasis which belongs to the general rule admitting the best evidence was gradually taken from it and placed upon the fact that there
are some opinions which, not being the best evidence, are not evidence;
and this fict was gradually transformed into a so-called general rule
that opinions are not evidence, and this artificial rule was treated as a
rule oL" law. The objection to this supposed rule against opinions is,
that it has usurped the place of the supreme rule admitting the best
evidence; that it is a mere statement of the supposed fhct that opinions
are not admitted under the rule of the best evidence, and that as a
statement of that kind it is not true.
The local peculiarity of Rochester v. Chester tended strongly to build
up and give unlimited emphasis to the supposed rule against opinions.
If a farmer could not give his opinion of the value of his neighbor's
farm, horse, or sled, of a ton of bay or bush,'1 of potatoes, there was a
difficultv in showing on what ground lie coul give his opinion of his
neighb,,r's sanity. The legislature restored the cimion law in reference to olini,,ns of values ; the court ought to r,.stre the coumno law
in refercnce to opinions of sanity.
The an,,m:.ly or our prc.ent practice is emaily Irav.ed to it--ource.
The inuo%, tiun and error of Poole v. Rh'lrd.,un crept into this- state

-
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surreptitiously between 1848 and 1865, after it had been kept out more
than forty years, and after the formal attempt to introduce it in S'ate v.
Corey had signally failed. Being open to all, and more than all, the
objections made against Rochester v. Chester, and having lost its sole
support when that innovation and error was swept away, it should be
allowed to disappear.
When the fact that some opinions.are not the best evidence had been
magnified and turned into the so-called general rule of law that opinions
are not evidence, and the rule admitting the best evidence was supplanted by it, it was thought necessary to find a special precedent for
every opinion before it could be admitted. The judgments of Westminster Hall were searched to find a decision that an opinion as to value
of property was competent; and to find another decision that an opinion
as to sanity was competent. No such decisions could be found. None
had ever been made because such opinions had always been received as
unquestionably competent. The reason of the failure to find the
decisions was not understood here. The failure was taken as conclusive
proof that in England the opinions were not admitted. When an
American mistake of this magnitude is discovered it is fit to be corrected
at once. To return to the true principle, is not to change the law but
to cease violating the law; or, putting it in a milder form, to allow that
which is the law de facto to yield to that which is the law de jure.
In criminal cases, it is often a question how nearly a footprint in
earth or snow, corresponded to the form of a shoe of the prisoner. A
witness who has seen tho footprint and the shoe, is allowed to give his
opinion on the subject, because a mere description of forms would not
be the best evidence. If a plaster cast of the track, or the original impression itself preserved by freezing, could be produced, this evidence
of its form would be more satisfactory than any verbal description. So
it is when an impression has been made upon the mind of a witness by
the appearance and conduct of the prisoner, indicating sanity or insanity;
that impression is the best evidence the witness can give on the subject.
His description of the appearance and conduct is, in fact, but indirect
and imperfect evidence of the impression; when he gives the original
impression itself, it is as if a footprint were brought into court.
In 1795, Sir A. G. Kinloch was tried for the murder of his brother
Sir Francis Kinloch: 25 St. Tr. 891, 985. Sir Francis, in making an
attempt to seize and confine the defendant, had been killed by him. The
defence was insanity. In the argument of Mr. Hope for the defendant,
the weight of opinions of insanity was presented in this manner: "And
now, gentlemen, in the face of all this evidence, in opposition to the
opinion of every friend who saw him, in opposition to the advice of every
professional person consulted on the occasion; in opposition to the impression of the family; to the attempt of Sir Francis : you, sitting here,
wanting the strong evidence which they had, his eyes, his looks, his
gestures, his tones, his whole demeanor; you, sitting here, I say, are
desired presumptuously to determine that all, all were mistaken; that
the prisoner was not mad, and coercion not necessary; and this you are
desired to do ;-Why? Because he killed his brother 1 Wonderful
conclusion! If anything was wanting to confirm the evidence arising
from the opinion of the family, that fatal event puts it beyond doubt.
If it could be doubted whether Sir Francis too thought him totally
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deranged; I answer, lie has sealed his opinion with his blood. They
had been taking precautions all night against danger and mischief from
the prisoner; and when the dreaded mischief happens, it is given you
as a proof that their precautions were unnecessary; admirable logic!
That they apprehended danger is clear.-Wby? They have told you
because they thought him mad; the mischief happens; and that which
they dreaded as the natural consequence of his madness, you are to take
as a proof of the soundness of his understanding." If the evidence thus
argued by Mir. Hope was inadmissible, the court should not have allowed
him to make that argument. But if a prosecuting officer should object
to such an argument being made, was there ever a court that would
sustain the objection ?
A non-expert may testify that, in his opinion, the plaintiff was sincerely
attached to the defendant (McKee v. Nelson, 4 Cow. 355, cited as law
in Robertson v. Stark, 15 N. H. 114); that the plaintiff "seemed satisfied" with a business arrangement proposed to him by the witness
. Co., 30 N. H. 487, 491); that the witness
(.Bradley v. S. F.
thought a horse "was not then sound, * * * his feet appeared to have
a disease of long standing" (Willis v. Quimby, 31 N. H. 485, 487);
that a horse "appeared to be well, and free from disease, that he travelled well, ate well, breathed freely"; that "running him round the yard
he showed distress in his breathing"; that lie thought he "never saw
any indication of the horse being diseased" (Spear v. Richardson, 34
N. H. 428, 429, 430, 431); that there were, at a certain place, "some
hard excavations, but nothing approaching the nature of hard pan"
(Currier v. B. & A. Railroad,34 N. H. 498, 501, 508); that a lady's
health, in the opinion of the witness, "had not been near so good since"
a certain time "as before," "that she had a very severe fit of sickness
in the fall of 1861, and that she recovered very slowly after she began to
mend," that the witness "considered her very sick" ; that the defendant, in carrying a barrel of flour at one time, and a barrel of sugar at
another, "seemed to carry them easily"; "that he should call the
defendant a very active man"; "that he had a scuffle with" the defendant, in which the defendant "was too much for him" (State v. Knapp,
45 N. H. 148, 149, 154); that the witness "did not see any appearance
of fright" in a horse at the time of an accident, that the horse "did not
appear to be frightened in the least, before he went off the bank or
afterwards," that "he appeared to be rather a sulky-dispositioned horse
to use" (Whittier v. Franklin, 46 N. H. 23); that a carriage not seen
by the witness, appeared, from the sound, to start from a certain point
State v. Skinborn, 46 N. H. 497, 501); that the plaintiff "seemed to
suffer, and seemed weak and debilitated," that " she did not seem to be
excited, frightened," that "she was lamer in the morning" than the day
before (Taylor v. Railroad,48 N. H. 304, 306, 309); and, since the
restoration of the common law, opinions of the value of property are
admitted here as well as everywhere else.
If opinions of physical condition are competent, opinions of mental
condition must be competent. The difficulty of proving physical health
or disease, without opinion, makes opinion a leigal grade of best evidence;
the difficulty of proving mental health or di-case, without opinion, is
still greater, and makes opinion more palpably a class of best evidence.
Lord Hale recognised the similarity of insanity and intoxication, and
VOL. XX.17
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treated of both under the head of "Idiocy,' Madness, and Lunacy."
After describing " dementia naturalis," and "dementia accidentalis,"
he says, "The third sort of dementia is that which is dementia affectata,
namely drunkenness. This vice doth deprive men of the use of reason,
and puts many men into a Perfect but temporary phrenzy; * * * such
a person shall have no privilege by this voluntary contracted madness,
but shall have the same judgment as if he were in his right senses": 1
Hale P. 0. 32.
In this case, it is unanimously decided that witnesses, not experts,
were properly allowed to testify that, at times the defendant did appear,
and at times did not appear, to be under the influence of intoxicating
liquor.
Admitting opinions of the influence of alcohol, and rejecting opinions
of insanity, is arbitrary. It was not so in Judge RICHARDSON'S day.
In State v. Corey, one witness testified there was one time when he saw
the defendant "out-cannot say whether he had been drinking or not";
and several testified that they had "never known of his being deranged
except from liquor." Exclude opinions of the influence of alcohol, and,
in many cases, it would be a trying task for the, jury to guess, upon the
evidence, whether the defendant was intoxicated or insane. The appearances and conduct which gave to one witness an impression that this
defendant was intoxicated, may have given to others the impression that
he was insane; and when a man is on trial for his life, the state is not
entitled to a monopoly of the opinions.
Under the exception of Poole v. Richardson, counsel who have introduced evidence tending to show insanity, have, in most, if not in all,
cases, been painfully.aware of the fact that their client's cause suffered
unjustly from the suppression of an important class of the best evidence.
The exclusion of opinions is practically a one-sided exclusion. A witness for the state is allowed to say that the defendant appeared natural
or as usual; that is a clear opinion; and it is understood and taken by
the counsel, court, and jury as a full and explicit opinion that the
defendant was sane. If the witness should testify in terms, that, in
his opinion, the defendant was sane, the effect of his testimony would
not be altered in the slightest degree. On the other side, a witness is
allowed to say that the defendant did not appear natural, or did appear
peculiarly or strangely; that also is a clear opinion; and if it were
necessarily understood and taken as a full and explicit opinion that the
defendant was insane, there would be no injustice, and the exception
excluding opinions would be totally abolished. If "unnatural," by its
peculiar use in this connection, should, in evidence, come to be synonymous with "insane," as "natural" is understood to be synonymous with
"sane," the legal question now under consideration would dwindle to a
point of literary taste. But the effect of the opinion that the defendant
did not appear natural, or did appear peculiarly or strangely, falls far
short of the effect of an opinion that be appeared to be insane; and the
state has this great and unfair advantage over the accused. If he has
feigned insanity for the purpose of escaping punishment, a mere narration by the witnesses of their observations of him, would probably appear
like very strong evidence of insanity; whereas this evidence might be
properly and truthfully rebutted by their opinions; they might have
observed evidence of simulation which they could not describe. And
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thus the modern, eccentric, ni.si prius ruling supposed by Mr. Tyng to
have been made in Poole v. Richardson, and unfortunately published by
him, operates unavoidably to oppress and endanger the accused, who, by
reason of insanity, are innocent; and to encourage crime by shielding
the guilty who feign insanity. Objectionable as the new dogma is in
all the details of its practical operation, it is also, in a purely legal
view, a violation of the elementary principle which admits the best
evidence. * * *
We have inserted the foregoing opinion, chiefly, because of the learning
and ability, as well al the exhaustive
thoroughness of that portion of the dissenting opinion of Dow, J., upon the
question of the admissibility of the opinions of unprofessional witnesses in regard to apparent insanity, in connection
with the detail of the facts upon which
such opinions are based. The learned
judge shows, very conclusively, both
upon authority and reason, that the opinion of the unprofessional witnesses in
such cases is commonly far more reliable, as a basis of ultimate decision, in
questions of sanity and mental capacity,
than any specific facts which could possibly be gathered from the witnesses.
We have said, in our book on Wills,
and in other places, all that we could

desire to say both as to the rationale of
the rule and the support which it receives from authority. The tendency
of the American courts, in the last few
years, has been largely in the direction
contended for by the learned judge;
and there seems to be little question it
must ultimately prevail all but universally. We should rejoice at such a
result as greatly tending towards the
establishment of truth, with greater
facility and certainty, in a very important class of cases.
We cannot doubt the profession will
regard this opinion as one of great value
upon this question, and as presenting
the decisions bearing upon it more exhaustively than can be found in any
other place.
I. F. R.
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Instruction to the jury that "If the contract was broken by the defendants, the
plaintiff" is entitled to be put in the same position, pecuniarily, as he would have
been, if the contract had been kept, regard being had to the fact that plaintiff soon

after obtained other employment," held correct.
EaoIt

to the District Court of Philadelphia.

A. D. Campbell, George M. Dallas,and James E. Gowen, for plaintiffs in error.
Richard P. White and George H. Earle, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WILLIAMS, J.-The principal question in this case relates to the

proper measure of damages for the breach of the alleged contract. The
District Court instructed the jury that "if the contract was broken by
the defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to be put in the same position,
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pecuniarily, as he would have been if the contract had been kept, regard
being had to the fact that the plaintiff soon afterwards obtained other
employment." This instruction is complained of as erroneous, because,
as contended, it furnished no proper rule by which to measure the damages, being but a general statement of the result to be arrived at, without any teaching as to how that result was to be attained. Where there
is no prayer for instructions, the court cannot be convicted of error except
for positive misdirection, though the instructions are not as full and
specific as they might have been. 'Mere omission to charge, as we have
often said, does not amount to misdirection, and where the proper rule
has been laid down for the guidance of the jury, the omission of specific
instructions to aid them in its application cannot be regarded, or assigned
as error. As no instructions were requested in this case, the only question is, whether the court was guilty of misdirection in instructing the
jury that the plaintiff was entitled to be put in the same position,
pecuniarily, as he would have been if the contract had been kept. This
was but another mode of saying that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
what he would have made directly out of the contract if it had been
fulfilled; and if so, there was no error in the instruction: l'oy v.
Granoble, 10 Casey'9. This of course excludes remote or speculative
damages. It was conceded on the argument Ithat the proper measure
of damages for the breach of the contract was the value of the bargain.
But what was the value of the bargain, if it was not the profit which
the plaintiff would have made immediately but of the contract if he had
been allowed to perform it? If the dampges found by the jury would
have put the plaintiff in the same position, pecuniarily, as he would have
been if the contract had been kept, then it is clear that he recovered the
value of his bargain, viz., the direct profit which he would have made
out of the contract if it had not been broken. We think that the rule
laid down by the court as the proper measure of damages was substantially correct, and we cannot say, therefore, that the jury were misled
by the terms in which it was expressed. Nor was there any error in
saying to the jury that "there is a difficulty in this case from the fact
that the plaintiff had incurred considerable expense in fitting u" the dyehouse; but still the evidence shows that the defendants were willing
that the plaintiff should remove the articles that he put there, so that
the only loss in regard to these articles would seem to be the loss of a
favorable opportunity of making profit by them." This was evidently
said for the purpose of preventing the jury from finding as damages the
expense incurred by the plaintiff in fitting up the dye-house, and limiting their finding, as it respects the articles which the plaintiff put in the
dye-house, to the damages occasioned by the loss of a favorable opportunity of making profit by their use in performing the contract. If the
improvements which the plaintiff made to the dye-house were necessary
in order to enable him to perform the contract, then the loss of a favorable opportunity of making profit by their use was a circumstance proper
for the consideration of the jury in determining the amount of damages
to which the plaintiff was entitled, and the defendants have no reason
to complain of the instruction. Besides, the evidence shows that the
expense of fitting up the dye-house far exceeded the value of the articles
when removed, and we see no reason why the plaintiff was not entitled
to recover the difference. If so, the instruction was more favorable than

